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_: FOREWORD
..7.
This report Is one of five documents covering the results of the Space
" Station Crew Safety AlternativesStudy conductedunder Contract
" NAS1-17242. The study documentation is designated as follows:
i
I
Vol. I - Final Summary Report (N_SACR-385_)
Vol, II - Threat Development (NASA CR-3855)
i- Vol. III - Safety Impact of Human Factors (NASA CR-3856)
Vol. IV - Appendices (NASA CR-3857) :i
.... Vol. V - Space StationSafety Plan (NASACR-3858) i
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•_ I. INTRODUCTION
--CONTRACTHISTORYANDBACKGROUND
The operation of a space station initiates newIssues regardin9 crew
" safe_. Potential crew activities Include construction, maintenance and
- repair of spacecraft, and scientific and applications experiments. These
. roles greatly expand man's activity in spacebut also increases the range,
..-L duration, and level of exposure to risk to crewmembersslgniflcantly.
Efficient, economicspace transportation system (STS) use does not pemit
__ continuous standby of a STSorbiter at the space station, and therefore, the ,
operational approachdiffers from Skylab and the Russian Soyuz programswhere
-- Earth-return systemsare available at the station, As the scopeand level of
::- mannedactivities expands, so does the issue of crew safety. 14oreImportance
_ must be given to strategies, alternative strategies, and other solutions asi necessary to counteract threatening situations. This study emphasis ts to
identify strategies or the combination of strategies which are cost effective
i and meet safety needs for the total spectrum of relevant safety issues. This
• study wtll examine the threats (both natural and induced) at the space station
_. and recommendappropriate control strategies. The strategies wtl1 includelternative str tegies such as escape/rescue.
The primary study contract was let in January, 1983. See Figure 1-1.
:_ At the Initial Rockwell-NASAmeeting, additional scopewas requested, that of
- extra-vehicular activities (EVA). EVAis, therefore, included in the study to
: assess EVAassociated threats. The initial contract conclusion In association
wtth research of analogousactivities suchas nuclear submarinesand arctic
_ stationactivity(representativespacestationsituationsof confinementin a
-- hostile environment) dictated a need to also examinetnfomatton regardingj humanbehavior. The NASALife Sciences organization at Ames, as a result of
:J thesefindings,addedfundsto the contractfor an additionalstudyextension
_ to assess potential hazards to crew safety stemmingfrom humanfactors/
Lt behavioral issues. This study report, therefore, attempts to provide a
_-_. compendiumof the resultsfrombothadditionaleffortcontractextensions.
Results of the Initial study were presented to the space station
contractors at a brtefln9 ileld in Downey,California at the midpoint tn the
total effort. On November9. 1983 the results were also presented to NASAat
- its headquarters (CDG,ConceptDevelopmentGroup). The presentation was
repeated at Langley on November10, 1983 and at Ameson November21, 1983.
Video tapes of the initial study interim briefing at Langley were.made
I- available to the other NASACentees. At an AmesProductivity Symposiumduring
the week of February 27, 1984, a third quarter contract presentation briefing) was given which summarizedthe first phase of the study and the mid-point of
). the humanfactorseffort, Briefedwere NASAand an audienceof contractors.
i
Subsequentstudy products were presented as noted.
._
I
l
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(• .._ A number of documents have been prepared durtnq the c_rse of ttle
contract. These are Listed be!ow:
IL2_4-400-83-0_0 . Kickoff Brlefinq Feb. 1983
55D83-00#7 - Space Station Crew Safety Criteria Apr. 1983
o_":•-'. $5D83-0064 - Mtdterm Brtefinq May. 1983
_--, SSD8}-0106 - Interim Briefing Nov. 1983
_ : SSD84-0106 - Third Quarter 5tatus Briefing Feb. 1984
= . SSD84-0052 - Space Station Crew Safety Alternatives Study -
_T Final Briefing May. 198#
i-_ SSD8_-0053 - Space Station Crew Safety Alternatives Study -
Final Report
•..'
Vol. I - Summary Report (NASA CR, 385_). II Threat Devel pment (NASXCR-3855)
_ " Vol, III- Safety Impact of Human Factors (NASA CR-3856)
' Vol. IV - Appendices (NASA CR-3857)
_ SSD84-0055 - Vol. V - Space Station Safety Plan (NASA CR-3858)
_ The results of the Space Station Crew Safety Alternatives assessment
!': are contained In five _,olumes, the designated NASA Contractor Report
:: Numbers of which are noted above. References are included In the Appendlx
• A of Volume IV - Appendices. Volume V Is a safety planning document which
identifies progc-ammatlc Issues and defines strategic task
• Interrelationships.
"_ :" PURPOSE
_3,!
_: --- The complete study objective Is to define space station crew safety
_, ' requirements and assess the various strategies developed to meet these
;._=r °.
i -:• requirements. Included In the objective Is : (1) to develop a crew safety
7 philosophy and attendant criteria; (2) to assess potential threats to crew
- safety associated with the existing space station design and operational
. concepts w_th Its attendant range of potential space activity scenarios In
"" order to identify key crew-safety Issues! and (3) to assess the various
.7 crew-safety strategies necessary to meet the desired criteria In terms of
;. reasonahl.e cost. To accomplish th!st It became necessary to Identify those
threats which could escape/rescue decisions. Addittonaltyt It was deemed•..
desirable to look at the baseline station and establish how It performs
:i: with respect to Identified threats. The baseline Is the configuration
• _,_ developed by Rockwell for the Space Station circa 3anuary 1983 using the
• i shuttle orbiter at regularly scheduled resupply intervals.
_
"'
,.
;1_-•..w_--_ =- .................._ _': "" _ ......" -°_ --7.
.... ; _ ;_._.._ - "_,,,..-.,_ -- , ....
..... " = "=........................... ......... O0000001-TSAll
_)
!
The scopeof this study c_onsiders (operatl_Aally' _e first 15 years of
l¢¢umulated space stattor_s currently in evaluation by NASAfor an
:-:: : tnttial operational capability (IOC) during the early 1990's, Crew safety
_ _i - ................
threatco_m_ratlons definedby the originalStatementof Workare:
•-: tndtvidua'[ illness or injury; system failures and operational accidents; and
:_. external threats, These threats are on-orbit debris, ground support and STS
_ proble_Lns,and I_rlefly considering indirect and direct effects of mtllta_
actions. It is intended that the depth of analysis ,_ consistent with
:: identifying key issues for crew_afety; defining key desi9n, operational, and
..'' cost features-ofvarlous alternatlve strateg+es| and determining approprl¢.te
.. crew-safety criteria and concepts for use by evolving future space station
- studies, z
ii _ The logtc used for the entire study considered three key points as
!roll.-" significant: First - philosophy; "Howmuchsafety is necessary (i.e., cost
.: effective?"); second, "Whatare the threats that the program is prepared to ,l deal with?"_-and-third, "What are the strategies and interdependence of these
t_li strategies to meet the criteria developedto deal with the threats?" A!:_ phtlosophy of "Cause no dam geto space station or i_uw to crew which would
result in a suspensionof operations" was selected. Table 1-1 provides a list
!_ii of thethreatsidentifiedduringthestudy, Inessencethecrttertatakesthephilosophy and_st_.es each threat in terms of the selected philosophy. Thestrategies were developed to satisfy identified criteria. The strategies, in
ii_-I-" general, are document_din three categories. These thre_ are: design
=_ ,: requirements, operational requirements, and safety devicesolutlons orcontingency requirements, iI
.
_: TABLE1-1 SPACESTATIONCREWSAFETY _ ._
_ THREATLIST i
'_ o Fire
o Leakage
o Tumbllng/Lossof Control
o Biological or Toxic Contamination
o Injury/Illness
o Grazi ng/Co11i ston
-- o Corrosion
-" o Mechanical Damage
_ o Explosion
•- - o Loss of Pressurization
__ o Radiation
__- • o Out-of-Control IVA/EVAAstronaut
_ : o Inadvertent Operations
: o Lack of Crew C_oordtnatton
o Ab_ndomN_ntof SpaceStation
• o Electrical Shock
:: o MeteoroidPenetration
o StoreslConsumablesDepletion
o Intrusion/Attack
o Structural Erosion
o Orbit Decay
o Loss of Access to _ Hatch
o Temperature Extremes
o Debris
_•_ 0 Free OPblt(EVAAstronaut) i
.•.
i 1
4 k
_-
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!_" .<-" " P,egardles_ of how well the desigr_sare engineered, the summaryis that
_. _."". there will always remain re+tdr_al ihi_ats associated with any baseline. There
-_-. '_'-.....................are several methodsone can use tj deal with ._omeof these re_tdual threat__
- : and perhapsthe best is the d._ve+opmentofnew t_e_ctm...O.q-_o_jT.___ -": - lternative m thod (which, tnct , r,tallv Is wher the stu(iy got tts name) to --
newte_hno;ogy develoF_nent,tc to apply developedescape_ rescue options.- - :----
i_ "';. The thlrd method_hic'a occur_sqn.a_1_1space program_: t_"_-ff-,1,r+. tn ate_4/.,j:2_._ ----
_ rtsk=a_ociatedwith pael:lcJlar prob]_ms-_hat are above a desired threshold of
-- rtsK exposu_e_ The magnitude of the threshold is driven princtpal]y by the
.Ji: " selected Spat., Station safety phiiosop_y.
:..--- STUL)YSUI414Ai+_.
.": "he Space Station Crew SaFety Alternatives Study is complete and several
| _- areas ar_j well defined; these are:
Threat and Strate_ Development
&. .
" ._ Identification of Threat_ to The..SlaeceSl:ation - BoChna_ur_l and
t_duced threats were examinedwith a tote1 of 25 tllreats identified _nd
+ . defined. A decision was ihstituted to place emphasison those major threats
_. which are configuration "drivers". Nine threats fell Into this categoPj:
.. fire, contamination, radiation, injury and 111ness, debris, mlcrometerlod
, ._. penetration, depressurizatlon and explosion. Although the other 16 threats
• are somewhich could present equally serious consequences,priorityfor
-" def;nitlon is restrictod by resource constraints for the study. Available
- resourc,.,shave beenused to develop an_ illustrate strategy concepts for th?.
_. nine threats considered to be "configuration di'ivers".
:-- Strategy Development- Someof the stragegies were_foundas synergistic (
f-_- _ith regard to the other threats. Ftre wasan example where the strategies • i
'- taken to preclude its occurrence, compoundedthe toxic contamination issue and
: ).... the explosion threat. Figure 1-2 illustrates this synergism, where, in the
_ -- case of fire/explosion, the strategies or solutions tended to complementone -
-- another. For someof the other threats such as debris and _diation, the
solutions tend to impedeeach other. For example, in the case of ionizing
radiation, it is apparent that the strategy should be a multiwall vessel with
.:_ _ absorbing filler to screen secondaw radiation and barriers to reduce
- s ,ndar_ radiation, (vtz, the level of RERSthat accumulate before the
:_ programmeduse ltfe is over). Non-ionizing radiation protection is also
• _ indicative of multtwall protection. For the debris threat, an optimum
--- solution is a dual wall with no ftller, enclosed in an evacuated annulus
-: established by the w_a-!-e-_cl_Chat impact ene_jy is spread-over a larger
._ area. Theseconsiderations present a conflict for exterior wall design.
..- Also, for vtsual sensing, one mayuse dual transparencies; consequencereduced
_ tran_ntsslvity. A dual wall is also desirable for pressure safety
. considerations. For temperature-considerations multiwall with insulation is
+__ preferable. (See Figure 1-3.) As one can detemtne, station exterior wall
• ; considerations regarding these particular threats result tn significant
=-._ b_rrie_r systemjdes__3ntrtdeoffs. Thesestrategy areas ,trtvtng design
: tradeoffs associated w{th each of the threats would in themselves require
.. significant study as the selected approach is resolved.
• _:;
: 5 ; _,
+)
-' -_
- 7_, .-_7-'- " --..= . _ :. : .= . :_ , .! _ o_, • .•, .
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; ll_reaL/Strate_Conclusions
-,- _ It__b___ca_me_apparent as the study progressed that creative design
.-- solutions and operationalwork-aroundscan provide a defense hlerarchyfor all
-_- : - the classes of threats except one -- that of lnju_/lllness. This category
" - becomes the singular justiflcatl_nfor an escape/re_scue_veb!c!e !_oc_a_t__d_a t__or
?- in proximity to the station. Injury and illnesses,when categorized,define
.. the populationof each of the categories requiring rescue. Tllepopulation is
: s)mwn in F!gu___s!-4 and I-5. Note that a bal1_stlc reentw vehicle (occupant
:::< experiencesbetwee, 6-B g's) could not accommodateany of these cases due to
::: the g load. A lifting body solution is the indicated. When one a!_soe_xplore__
:.. the percentageof a l,_rgecrew that could need to escape, an even more
. distu_ing discriminatoremerges; lack of capacity. Figure.I-5 shows typical
causes which could d_ve the need for escape for _ to 3 pc..le.
!t-,-:
_. i
. BARRIER STRATEGY BARRIER
........._ ISSUE REQUIRE_NTS REQUIREMENTS
•,_'.M, IONIZING MULTIWALLWITH REDUCEINTERNAL
i_i RADIATION ABSORBINGFILLER RADIATIONTOTBD_EM
,_'__: NON-IONIZING IIULTIItALL REDUCETO10_4_,i,:,2
-_ ' "•" RADIATION
•-_ DEBRIS DUALWALL- NO ;ul)GRAM
z- FILLERINEVACUATED PART'CLESATTBD
,_, _ ANNULUS VELOCITY
•-,...... VISUAL DUALTRANSPARENCIES TBDTRANSMISSIVITY
' '_" SENSII_G --
." "° ..
:_:.-. !'RESSURE DUALI.IALL TBDflAX
7_,, ..
elrITERACTINGELEt.IENTSOFBARRIERSYSTEMSSHOULDBESTUDIED& ASSESSEDASAN
, _ IfllEGRATEI)SYSTEF
/ Figure I-3 Barrier System Issues for Habitable Modules
I ._..,,
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ISOLATION;ANTICOAGULANT
" RETURNTO ENCEPHALITIS, INTRAVENOUSFLUIDS,TRACHEOTOMY,
EARTH MYOCARDIALINFARCTION, SEDATIVES,OXYGEN,ANTICOAGULANT,
.. ILEITIS CLINICALLABORATORYTESTS,
ANTISPASMODICS,SPECIALDIET
*SERIOUSNESS& EXTENDOF THESEILLNESSESHAYREQUIRERETURNOF CREWMENTO EARTH
• " MINOR NOLOSTTIME ATHLETESFOOT, FUNGICIDES,STEROIDS,ANTI-
." ILLNESS OERI'&_TITIS, BIOTICS, ANTIHISTAMINES,I4OSE
CONJUNCTIVITIS, DROPS,DECONGESTANTS,ANALGESICS,
RHINITIS,URETHRITIS, ANESTHETICLOZENGES,IMPROVED
PHARYNGITIS,ABSCESSOF HYGIENEPRACTICES
.T_ MOUTH& GLJM
::'-" LIMITED DUTY BRONCHITIS,CYSTITIS, ANTIBIOTICS,DECONGESTANTS,
i ORMINIMUH DIARRHEA,DYSENTERY, ANTITUSSIVES,ANALGESICS,LOSTTIME FEVER,COMMONCOLDOR CATHARTICS,ANTISPASMODICS,
: ((1-WEEK) INFLUE_;ZA,GASTRITIS ANTIPYRETICS,ISOLATION,
• ANTIEMITICS,SPECIALDIET
.'. FigureI-5 PossibleCrew Illnessesand RequiredTreatmentand Provisions
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i Earller obeervatto.s that most of the threats can be mitigated by
creative design solutions and operational work-arounds, should not be
i!i ! nl;erpreted as lYessesstng the-absence of a- rtsk element. Qn the contrary, .i
severalthreatsrequireprecisestrategiesthatmustbe well-d_eflned_arlyin
the program. Table 1-2 lists the summarysafe_ issues selected duping the
study as requiring I htgh pHortty of definition early in the prcJram.
I cl.,deal in Table 1-2 are ypical recomended strategies Figure 1-6 d_picts
_ representative strategies involved in dealing with the debris threat. Note
_.,_ thatthereis a finiteanw}untof riskwhichmust be acceptedfor eachof the
_= threats.
:--Tk
_ Addedstrategies are shownin VolumeIII of this report. For example,
_; pastAmericanspaceeffortshavefocusedprimarilyon the physiological
:=, aspects of crew activity and today, addedemphasis is considering the ,
i_! psychological. It is suggested by the Illustration t_t an appropriate '
'r_ il
i_._ responseto the lack of coordination issue requires a oalanced focus similar
___-. to our present efforts, augmentedby manyof the techniques used by the
!:_ Russians.
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; ". ENVIRONMENT
" i_:': (THREATS) THREAT STRATEGIESi
-:,..
•" NATURAL "DEBRIS •INTEGRATEDBARRIERSYSTEMDEVELOPMENT
_: * RADIATION
. INDUCED •CONTAMINATION •MATERIALREQUIREMENTSDEVELOPMENT,SCREENING
: CATALOGING,REAL'TIMEMONITORING,INVENTORYING,,
"_" : __ DISPOSAL& CONTROLSYSTEM
.:.. *lACK OFCOORDINATION* *CREWSELECTIONORIENTATION,INDOCTRINATION&
• ltUN,NISOFTWARI[ TRACKINGPROGRAM
SYSTEMINTERXCTION
!." •MAN/MACHINE •CREW(ORBIT/GROUND)TRAININGPROGRAM• INTER TION
• ATTITUDEISSUES
: INHERENT *INJURY/ILLNESS * LOW"G" RESCUEVEHICLE
_ *REAL-TIMEHEALTHMONITORING
!,,.. •CREWFITNESSr.'AIhTE!IAf;CE
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- Figure I-6 Debris Strategy Options
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-"L)- ALTER!IATIVESTRATEGIES
This segmentof the summaryIHghlights the options for escape and
J - rescue. Severalquestionswereexamined,i.e." "Howrealisticis ii;to
:_i: evacuatethe spacestationif the needarises?";"Dothe threatsrequirean
.- immediate response?"; "What are the technology risks?"; "Are the costs
: prohibitive?";and "Howmanyof the crewwillthe escape/rescuemode
... accommodateand how longdoesit taketo es-czp_-(leav__ areaof threat)?";
-.• "Whal;is the relationshipbetweentimeto repairvs, time-to-adverse-lmpact?"
• (Itshouldbe recognizedthatthesescenariospostulatevariousdegreesof
.•- calamity);and "WHYwouldlessthana fullcrewdesireto escape?" The major
.... postulateswHY lessthana fullcrewwouldwishto returnto earthare shown
.. in Table 1-3. As previously discussed the medtcal issue is the only one
.. identified that would cause credible escape or rescue situations and it
Impllesthe needfor a liftln9body ratherthana ballistlcreentryvehlcle,
- If the station programelects a one manor two man escapeor rescue vehicle,
• it would evolve serious questions: 1) "Can the program tolerate 8 or 4, or
even 3 separal_eescape vehtcles at the station?"; it is difficult, and
significantly costly, to retrieve B numberof escape vehicles simultaneously.
l 2) "Whatis the timerequiredto enterthe escapevehicle?"Designs(for
l':IJ other ttlan medical evaluations) should contain a dedicated breathing system to
•- enhancethe initialoverallavailabletimesuchas associatedwith entryof an
J_ _ . l ' EVA-typeescape
=-" Next, Figure 1-7 shows generic options for escape and rescue which may
..... be groupedwithin 5 categories. Option A has, located at tile space station,
• an escapevehiclewhichescapesto earthwiththe actualrescueperformedby
the Navyor Air Force. OptionB is a mannedOrbitalTransferVehicle(OTV)
and"provides-thecrewwithopportunities•to relocateto a secondstationeto
. : pickup neededrepairpartsand returnto spacestation,repairthe station,
__ • andcontinue operations. Option C is an external safe tzaven. In this option,
the crew egresses to the station and awaits rescue by the orbiter or friendly
;'l l:"_ vehicle which t,hen proceeds to earth by somepreselected means. Option D
consists of an internal safe havenwhich provides for rescue by the orbiter or
:_ l" l" " otherfriendlyvehicleat a latertime. A groundlaunchedsupplyvehicleor
- rescue vehicle, can be sent as the Russians did in late 1983, to repair the
.... space station and thereby allow it to resumeoperations. Also, if a rescue
.- vehicle were available and repair was not feasible, the crew could reenter and
_ l " l returnto earth. The responsetlmefor an internalsafehavenis hiohly
favorable and requires a short time to enter and because the capability is
..- inherentto the SpaceStation,it presentslow technicalrisk.
_._..
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_. TABLE!-3 WHAT WOULDCAUSEESCAPE
1 MAN? 2 MEN? 3 MEN?
i l o SOLESURVIVOR o TWOSURVIVORS o THREESURVIVORS(REMOTE
... PROBABILITY) ESCAPING
IMPENDINGDISASTER
o PHYSICALMEDICAL o INDIVIDUAL CREWMAN o DECEASED
/ ISSUE (CUT, SOME MEDICALISSUE
BURNS) REQUIRINGCONSTANT
AID BY MEDIC
o PHYSICAL
o PSYCHOLOGICALISSUE o PSYCHOLOGICAL
o DECEASED o DECEASED
" n H H !A I _EROENCY_ ESCAPE EARTH:- _ .CAPE RECOVE_ RE_-
_i I,II'_ZCLE(S) TO.R_ RESCUE
•. L_D/WA_ER
" _ " _ _NHED | ' _ TO A LJ RE_URN TO U _NT, NUE ,
II oT, _ .:OHO]IISTATION'II _E.TIONS- I I _ STATION REPAIR
RESCUE
.. SPACE$_TION EGRESS_: SAFE OPEMTION REENTRY-
i E_CY RAIDED HAVEN. eORBITER
EVENT • UNAIDED EXTERNAL • FRIENDLY
VEHICLE
!" RESCUEOFE_TION''" •ORBITER ,_• FRIENDLYVEHICLE
. SE_t REPAIRSPACESUPPLY S_TION &
_-"_ VEHICLE RESUHEOFE_TIONS
/
_ 'i_ / SENDRESCUEVEHICLE REENTRY-
(GROUND-LAUNCHED) EARTH.LANDI_
H H IORBITER ES_PE TO LANDING": VEHICLE REENTRY KSC, EAFB,ETC.
Figure 1-7 Escape and Rescue Options
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An STSOrbtter Vehtcle on.Station, or berthed nearby, offers untque
benefits. For example, constder the ftrst time that a speclftc hazardous
" operation ts being performed at the statton, suchas transferring hydrazlne.
It would be prudent to have the orbtter stand by at the statton durtng thts
- operation.In fact,If the orbiterIs standlngby In the vlclnltyof the
station durtng any ftrst time rtsk activity, the overall prog_'amrisk-level ts
significantly reduced. Another consideration for thts option would be to
_vtde for escape of emtnent technical scientists or personnel who In the
noustrtam world possess a one-of-a-kind capability. The program, in thts
context also may not wtsh to rtsk those who are not basically adapted to space
to remain tn o_tt 60 days or more as a functton of the next vehicle routinely
returning to the statton. A proposedsolution would be to hold tile Orbiter
_v_tcle over a day or two (relative cost consideration betng less than one
millton dollars a day).
EVASAFETYISSUES
An evaluation was performed of EVAfor the Space Statton. _ong these
were scenarios examining the current philosophy of EVAand evaluating results
of the current shuttle mtsstons Involving EVA. Several observations were made
_gardtng EVAdeficiencies. First, as currently performed, EVAts treated
almost as an afterthought tnstead of an integrated system. Oneof the key
decisions ts whether EVAwtll be a routine activity or a special event.
Although the cumulative rtsks may appear htgher for routinely-performed EVA
due to increased exposure, the risks per EVAare thought to be greater for the
"special event" modedue to the lack of familiarity with the equipment
interface which would cause tndiv|dual excursions to be more risky. It is the
Rockwell Safety optnton that EVAshould be a baseltned operation.
_! _ Whether EVAts baseltned or not, several poltcy decisions are
advtsable:
a) The EVAsuit must be destgned to preclude prebreathing. Thts
capability does not currently extst on the Shuttle but one can reenter and
land within 168 minutes in most contingencies.
b) The EVAsuit should be capable of betn9 inspected, maintained and
easily de-contamthated on-orb1t.
c) EVAatrlocks should be destgned to sampleand recycle internal
atmosphereback to a supply rather than vent-to-space during depressurtzation
operations to mtntmtze consumablesbudget expenditures. For contaminated atr,
the capability for dumptngto space should extst,
:. d) Capability for a decompressionchambershould be available.
e) Provisions should be madeto protect the suited crewmanfrom
hazardousIncidents such as hypergollc sptlls or increased solar flare
actl vt ty.
These and other considerations such as that of maintainability tends toindicate th a vantage f utilizing the ard sui technology which is
,_ currently approachlng maturlty.
I
-! i
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("-" :- SAFETY ASPECTS OF HUI4ANFACTORS
T2_. "
i_ - In viewing space as a hostile environment to unprotected manand in
......- recQgnltionof _rlca's experienceas developing,an approachwas takento
_, col!e_c_ and analyze data from stressful endeavors or environments analogous to
:lel;" those associated with the crew of a space station. Of those examined, two
_i.:..- (submarinesand antarctlcmissions)exhibiteddesirablecharacteristics,viz,
_-2:i'.. 111a largepopulation,(2)well definedscreenln9 of personneland 131
:_ -: c_npetent post mission assessmentby psychologists and humanfactorsi.,_., ; .
...... •: specialists. Figure 1-8 emphasizesseveral stressors associated with theit_L_ - ''--
:[_- confinedspaceof submarinesand t_ isolationof antarcticstations. It is
_-_. of interest that humanfactors equations of the space station embodythe worst
_- • of both submarine and anta_tic environments plus that of micro g.
_ The Russianpracticeof providingpsychologicalsupportpre-misslon,._ - ._ duringt_ mi sion,and post-mlss on,pre entsone of the m s sign fica t
- strategies. Evenwtth the added Russianemphasisof psychological support,
- there is someevidence that their record 211-day mission was geminated for
.;- - psychological causes rather than physical.
romp
IT" SUBMARINE SPACESTATION _)_'rARCTIC
_iJ[_..=.. • CLOSEI)CYCLE • • LONGIPERIODSlo,_OF
•" ENVIRONRENT • SOl.AT
. _ • NOCOIe(U:;ICATION
? • • CRaWleDQUARTERS_ "' m
, o :TT , : " ' oRELIANC._ ONMEDICAL
CAPAEILI?Y
eRO "QUIET" PLACE- •
• ESCAPEt_OTPOSSIBLE
'" •CLOSECREW.NTERACTION _ INMEDIAT_LY
- _QUIRED
• --e HOSTILE_VIROHMENT
*" CANNOTBI AVOIDED
• OPERATIONS& TRAINING
" PRII_EMISSION • •SURVIVALDEPENDSON
.F OUTSIDE=ORCES
'_ . e--.---..m--..--_e STATION!,IAINTENANCE
• PRI_E_:SSION
• NOTE:
MOSTSEVEREISSUESFROMEACHENVIRONMENTDIRECTLYAPPLYTO SP:C_-STATION
_, FigureI-8AggregateStressorsfor the SpaceStation
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SELECTEDOPEN ISSUES
SeveralissuesIdenl;Ifledduringthe_courseof the studydemandfurther
_: expansionas resourcesbecomeavailable,The foll_wingissuesare emphasized
• _ becausethe teclmlcalcommunityappearsto lackuniformagreementas to the :
propercourseof actionrelativeto existingspaceconfigurations.Tileissues
. are summarizedin threecategories,viz.,A) technical,B) programmaticand,
- C) humanfactors.
: Technical
SafeHaven- MultipleSafeHavensConceptand AttendantLimitations.
_. Propos_f'igurations whichconsidereverypressurizedvolumeas a "safe
• haven",lack practicalityas eachhabitablevolumewouldneedto incorporate
the requirementsof safehaven(viz.,food,thermal,breathingair,CO
removal,etc.). Conversely,if the havenis dependentuponanothervolumefor
.- its ilabltableelments,thenthe volumeis not a definedsafehavenbecause :
:: survival maybe lessened due to volume interdependence on evacuation (or
-: "escaped from").
-_ Depressurization- How HanyVolumeChange-Outs?Volumechangeout
_! possessestwo_aajorvariables,thatof the safetyphilosophy(failsafevs.
:i It isfail-operational/failsafe)and themagnitudeof volumeinvolved.
': desirable to requirea faiI-operational/fail-safecapablIity but tlle .
- consequenceis an "over-kill"if appliedto the entirestation. .,
_'_ j
-." ResourceUtilityHoduleConce2_t_- A conceptualsinglefailurepointis
.._.-_ definedif the resourcemodulefu_c_ns are locatedin a singlevolume. When
modulefunctionsare distributed,thena measureof damagetolerance xists
.. comparedto the vulnerabilityof a singlelocation. Further,severalconcepts
considerthe resourcemodule(s)as an unpressurizedvolume(s).Conceptually
an unpressurizedvolumemay be acceptablexceptfor evidencethatthese
moduleswlll containmost of the high-maintenancehardware. Accomplishing
repairin the volumesrequiresan EVA (pressure-suit)capabilitywhichappears
°- to presenta largerexpenditureof resourcesas well as providingattendant
... higherrisk.
:- OualEBressCapability- The studyconcludesthat it is highlydesirable
for all habitablemodulesto inherentlyhavealternativescaperoutesor
modesof egress. The possible exception to this conclusion is the lab module
".: or work place where hazardous substances can be placed at the opposite end of
an egress area and alternate techniques of escape implemented suchas allowing
•- - peopleon dutyto leavethroughan adjacenthatchor airlock.
• Synergismof Strategies- The positiveand negativesynergistic."_
contributionsof-IndiVidualstrategieswere dlscussedearlIer in this
narrativeand illustratedthe rangeof solutionsto fire/explosionand
_-_ radlation/debrlsthreats. Of particularsignificanceis thatthereis no
single action or actions as a strategy for any of the complex threats but
-: rather a family of solutions. Paramount, therefore, is the selection of and
% commlttmento a strategyapproachthatprovidethe mostcost-effectiveness.
.'F
Programmatlc
The programmaticissues,thoserequiringprudentmanagementactionare
'_ emphastzedbelow:
14 \
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. . The VariableFacllitySyndrome- On earththereexiststwo distinct
--- safety'disciplines'systemsafety,whichconsidersthe safetyof crew,
•7 •
. .... hardwareand personnelduringall aspectsof design,operationand human
._ interface,and Industria!safe_ywhichgovernsthe workplaceenvironment
. (OSHA).
"- --- The space station will not be compatible with an OSHA-typediscipline,
'._...... but ratherit is a sophisticatedvarla¢lonof systemsafeW. The stationis a
./;: facilitythatchan9eswitl)eacharrivaland departureof an orbiterin that
the orbiter either deltvers or retrieves consummables,products, materials,
" fluldsand/orexperimentsto/fromthe facility.The limitationsof the
" " industrialsafetyapproachis thatno provisionexistfor tliezero-9
_-" : uniqueness , the station configuration or its response to the unique
7 environmental constraints. It has been estimated that less than 25%of the
;- _ Industrialsafetyrequirementsare useablein a spacestationsetting.
- Total SystemSafety Integration Function Should Be Guided By Strategies-
.._. ClassicalsystemIntegratlonfunctlonsare performe'dat level2 (B)basedon-"
..... inputsfromvariouslevel3 (C)elements.Thisintegrationbecomeseitheran
• interface analysis or a "top-down" assessmentor both. The limitations of
: thisapproachis thatthe integrationfunctionis limitedby the qualityof
.... dataand is at the schedulemercyof dataprovidedby level3 (C)elements
F:-. ... whichmoreoftenresultin after-the-factexaminations.Theappropriate
_ approachis to havean independentup-frontstrategyfor eachof the threats
' and measurethe complianceto eachstrategyof the totalvehiclelevel2 (B)
!': and 3 (C).
Cost of Strategies - There may be several design and operational
-.'.. o_
;. solutions to a given threat. Some-of these are less expensive while others
:, havefixedcostsas opposedto havingrecurringcosts. Alsothe issueof
_ _ synergisticeffectsof varioussolutionsin a strategyneedto be well
-?." understood.
i_ HumanFactors
• Someof the moresignificantopenissuesin HumanFactorsare:
Absenceof a ProperRepositoryfor Non-DesignCriteria/Requirements-
: Design-and operational solutions are drlv'en by requirements which satlsf_
criteria, someof the humanfactor strategies, however, involve programmatic
• _ issuessuchas crewselection,crewtraining,medicalprofileforcrew
selection,etc.,whichhaveno requirementshomefor use on the station.
. Others,suchas acousticsor contaminationcan be specifiedin requirements
documents.
••:- Absenceof a Strong Sponsorfor Key HumanFactor Issues - The study
concludes that the measureof successof removl'nga given humanstress is
.L- highly dependenton its overseer such as the governmentand the particular
•_ Influence. An example is in the area of acoustics within the habitable
, module(s). Volumeill,Section5, showsthe impactof the lackof a strong
accousticsdefinitionfor the Apolloand ShuttleOrbiterprograms.
, ,...
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:,._,;.,. NeedFor Hedical Diagnosttc/Tt:eat_ent Cent.erOn-Boardt_heStAtion -':.. Availability of data le_curren-n-_ly1nsufflclent to de'flne medlcal fac1llty
i _ - for the space station. It is understoodthat the medical communityis
:_ _ currently reaching an agreementon the minimummedical facility requirement.
i Froma humanfactors perspective, there is a need for minimummedical
capability sufficient to provide the crew with confidence of survival and
.i - well-being during all anticipated emergencies.
:' Needfor ExpandedEmphasison Crew Selectfon/Tratntng - A review of the
safety_impacts of humanfactors "In_i'_ates that more sdphlsticated cre_nembers
,_ screening and a greater dedication to tratntng for all tasks would do muchto
- minimize stressor impact on space station personnel.
,[1,
_. : SUMMARY
_: .:" The study indicates that a maturewell-defined station possesses
_ operational scenarios whicn Include redundancyand appropriate technical and
humanprovisions for dealtng witll threats. There exists at this time no
4 : Justification for a dedicated on-orbit rescue vehicle. Onestudy conclusion
.: ,,o
is that during the build-up phase the programwill experience hazardous
'. situations or risks that cannot be avoided. These risks, however, are not
_: :... excessive.
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::-- 2. STUDYAPPROACH
:.=- The Space Station Crew Safety Alternative Strategies AssessmentStudy is
- a smallbut strategicllnk in ti_eactivitiesnow gettingunderwayto establish
=- and define a SpaceStation as the next major U.S, space program. Mannedspace
--:- flight experience on tile Shuttle has shownthat safety considerations play a
::- detemlnino.rolein establishlng Impotentconfiguratlonaland operational
._.: featuresof any program.
.. To effectivelyand efficientlyidentifytechnicalrisksituations,
methodsof dealingwiththembecomeessentialin the designand operational
'. process. The techniqueused herewas to identifythreats(life/survival-
_)_: : threateningsituation)and strategiesto dealwitheach situation.
: °
+,, A numberof terms recur throughout the study. In Table 2-1 these terms
" are deflned.
_:' ,.- TABLE2-I - INTERPRETATIONOF TERI4S
.... PHILOSOPHY:Summarystatementof programsafety
_ - objectiyesh : ...
-.:i,_.-:. THREAT: Situationwhichendangerseitherthe crewor
,:_ th-_ace station
_:" .... POTENTIALTHREATS: Threatswhichmightarise,without
_'._ regar([to prob_abllity,frequency, or severity
ii_ : SPECIFICTHREATS:Threats which liave been de':ermtned
"i_ i tohave a combinationof probability,frequencyand/or
I severityfor a givenscenariothattheymustbe dealtwith
:: CRITERIA:Statementof designor operationalmeansto
" contr'o)'indlvidualthreats
//" SCENARIO:Set of missionactivitieswhichcreate
_"" _i-Ens for speclflc threats.,_,'
/ : KEY SAFETYISSUES: Safetyconcernsthathavesignificant
°- designor operationalimpacton the spacestation
- • STRATEGY: usedto
- __ Approach achieveresolutionof key
i'ssues
.-. GUIDELINESANDREQUIREHENTS:Specificdesignor
:_ :'- - op-6_-tlona'l "requir_-mentSrecommendedfor the next phase
:_ ..... of the space stationprogram
- t.
,. The studydevelopmentlogic,identifiedthreats,tllestrategy
. developmentlogic,the strategydevelopmentprocessesare definedin the
followingpages. Thosetop eightthreatswhichhaveimpliedma_jor
... . configurati nor operationalimpacthavebeendealtwith in separatesections
T_ " of VolumeIf,
..I,!
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" STUDYLOGIC
The studywas,by contractdeflnltlon,dividedintoslx tasks. These
.y. were; (1)LiteratureSearchand DataCollection,(2)Crew S_,[etyCriteria.
_., (3) Sc-enarloAssessment,(4) Assessmentof "Baseline"Crev,SafetyConcept,(5)
-. Assessmentof AlternateCrewSafetyConcepts,and (6)13evelopmentof a spac_
stationsafetyPlan. Figure2-I showsthe logicthatwas developedfor the
:- studyand the boundariesfor the six tasks. A briefrecapof eachtask
.,.L fol 1ow._:
,- Task1 - Collectand analyzetechnicaldatato providea database file
•. and a technicalassessr,ent of tiledataby taskcategories.
,,
.. Task 2 - Developa crewsafetyphilosophyandcriteriawhichallowa
" properbalanceto be obtainedbetweenpersonnelsafety,the valueof the
spacestationand theexposurewhichthe NationalSpaceProgramreceives
In a contingencysituation.The criteriaw111be designedto mitigate
:i threatsin a mannercompatiblewlth the philusophy.
_ Task3 - Identifyoperations- relatedsafetyissues,whichin concert
,_.:.. withconfigurationissuesmust be addressedto minimizeriskto an
acceptablelevel. The variableof how the spacestationconfiguration
..... may be requiredto functionas a resultof specificoperationsoften
., requires significant modification of proposedsubsystemslocations and
:._ capabilities.
i - Task 4 - Assessmentof the "baseline"crew safetyconceptprovidesa
_. determination of howwell the autonomyof the space station and shuttle
-
rescue at nominal resupply missions can satisfy the crew safety criteria
• and hencemitigatethe crewsafetythreats.
• Task5 - Assessmentof alternatecrewsafetyconceptsallowsone to
.- examinethe threatexposurereductionby use of meansotherthantlle
"baseline".
•" Task 6 - The spacestationsafetyplanwillallowearlyemphasisof
studyresultsin a formatthatthe NASAmay use for advancepl_.n.ningon
- phasesB and C/D.
l" Figure2-I depictsthe logicusedfor accomplishingthe abovesix
tasks. It shouldbe notedthatoncea philosophyfor the stationhas been
selected,the challengebccomestwo-fold.First,the identificationof all
.. crediblethreats(or rlsk-generators)and second,the developmentof a course
• of actionto eitherpreclude the occurrenceof eachthreator reducesuch
• occurrenceto an acceptableconsequence.In lightof the predetermined
philosophycrediblethreatscannotbe completelyeliminated.The preferred
, approachIs to use a threatreductionprecedenceconsistingof (I)elimination
):"-_ by redesignor othermeans,(2)minimizethe impact,and (3) safetydevices
: and contingency procedures. (Ref. NHB5300..1(D-2)).
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../._. The techniquesfor dealing wlth Indlvldualthreats are colledstra_gies. A strategy is a consciouseffort:to render a given _hreat
:_'_._:,. harmless,or at least no greater titansome predeterminedrisk threshold.
i'.i:i Strategiesmay be simple (i.e.. fix tltehole for a leaking volume) or complex
(i,e,, lower the volume pressure wltllvolume Inhabitantsusing IVA masks or
oxygen bottles because of atmosphericcontamination). The mechanl_m for
' '- transferringa threat to a solution Is a criterion. Criteriaare generally
_i!i_ :' top-levelstatementsof pollcy and are true for a11 verified threats Tile
• method of implementi,,ga criterim_ i_ usually a requirementwhich may be
:_i-_.:.i_,_ eitllera design requirementor an operational requirement. A third type of
:_-:..._,i.:.__ requirement Is oi_,efor safel,y devices and contingencyprocedures. These are
........, _ - less desirabie in i,hat they are usually the last line of defense against a
._:__-_: threat. A brief discussionof criteria is provided below.
:mm_EL_-=.
_: The final segment of tilelo_ic flow deals with alternate strategies,
_!:.:L--._ . .
_;:_: _ tllosestrategieswhich address threats which cannot oe eliminatedby redesign
or other means. There are basically three strategy categories: a)
!_:_;.f Escape/Rescue,b) Deve'iopmentof new technologies,and c) Risk ac_eotance. A
_.!!_::_.-_. separate section of thi_ report is dedicated I;othe subject of escape and
':-.._"_.cii, rescue. New technologieshave been studied in some detail and nave several
:-._:..... promising benefits to the Itealthof the station and its crews. Risk
,__,-.=_'=_-_-.. acceptance _llows a disciplinedexaminationof the unresolved (or
:.._..._:-_ unresolvable)safety i_sues and the arrival at management decisions regarding
_:'-.... their credibilityand acceptability.
...._-E +_.L_,""
:_V_T. -
,_:-_...L CREW SAFETY PHILOSOPHY
ii_ '- Rockwell has been intimatelyinvolved in assistingNASA to establish
_ F_- safety philosophiesand criteria, startingwith Apollo (where systematic
_-'=_' safety programs were initiated),through Skylab Apollo-Soyuz,and on the!_.._ -
__:_._.;. Space Shuttle. It is interestingto trace the evolutionof crew safety
F_ philosophy througl_these programs,and to understandthe reasons for this
•- evolution. Table 2-2 illustrateskey features of these philosophiesor
....._ goals. The emphasis has gone historicallyin two directions: (I) a tendency
I_: to go from escape and rescue measure (e.g., abort systems) toward obtaining• inherent safety (i.e., red ce/_!iminatethre ts); and (2) an i,_creaslng
- ... interest in saving not only the crew, but also the very valuable space
systetas.We expect these trends to continue as space operationsmature and
" become more routine,and as space hardware becomes more expensive,with longer
mission durations. The safety philosophywhich was basellned for _he crew
: safety alternativestrategiesstudy was consistentwlth these trends, and is
shown in Table Z-S, selectedfro_:ia few potential philosophies.
.,.°.
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TABLE2-2ROCKWELLEXPERIENCEIN THE DEVELOPMENTOF
-. SAFETYPHILOSOPHYIN SPACEPROGRAMS
APOLLO loCREW SAFETYGOAL..999- Io_NY UNKNOWNSAT TIME I
IoABORTCAPABILITYINALL MISIONPHASESIoWORLD-WIDEXPOSURE I
•-_ IoBACKUPMODESFOR CRITICALFUNCTIONS I OF PROGRAM I
I I
• APOLLO-SOYUZIoABORTCAPABILITYINALL MISIONPHASESloPROVENHARDWARE I
.;. IoBACKUPMODESFOR CRITICALFUNCTIONS Io SINGLEMISSION I
SKYLAB [oLAUNCHCREWAFTERSKYLABSUCCESSFULLY[oUSE OF EXISTING
I
ORBITED I HARDWARE IIo C EWESCAPEAVAILABLEBYAPOLLOCSM
, I I
- SPACESHUTTLEIoABORTCAPABILITYUSIN8THEORBITER Io SPACEPROGRAMMATURITYI
-- Io LIMITEDCREWESCAPESYSTEMDURING Io EMPHASISONELIMIN- I
I ORBITALFLIGHTTEST I ATINGCONTROLLING I
" io BACKUPMODESFORCRITICALFUNCTIONSI THREATSRATHERTHAN I
i:.. Io ORBITER-TO-ORBITERRESCUEOF CREW I ESCAPINGFROMTHEM I
o..
" TABLE2-3 SPACESTATIONPHILOSOPHYPRECEDENCE
" CURRENTOPTIONS COMMENTS
• .CAUSEIlODAPtAGEtlHATSnEVERTOSPACESTATION DESIRABLE,COSTRADE _ .
ANDNOINJURYTOCREW!
,_ .CAUSEtlODAtte_GETOSPACESTATIOtiBEYO;!D COST RADE
I, + ROUTINEMAINTENAIICECAPABILITY
i .CAUSENODAMAGETOSPACESTATIONRINJURY BASELINEPHILOSOPHY
i ; TOCREel_!HICH_'IILLPESULTINASUSPEt!SION
OFOPERATIO_IS
..- .SPACESTATIONREPAIPABLEAIIDC,PEPATIOtlAL KAYREQUIREESCAPE/RESCUE
"- _ITHINA SPECIFIEDPEP,IODOFTI_!E
• .CREWSURVIVALTEXPERSEOFTHE_PACE I{:PLIESEVACUAT[OIIANDRESCUE,
- STATION ASAMII_ItIUM
.:_
- . _ :_
21 _ _
• . . • ...:'. . . . • :'.-" _"_"- ----
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iTHREATS
A threat is a situation which endangers_ither the c_ewor the spacestation. Threat may be grouped in seve_l ¢aC_.J3ories: simple or complex,
personal or community, time-dependent or spontaneeusand natural or self-
. . induced by the station. The author has defined a threat as simple or complex
based on the physics of Its-occurrence. For example, a depressurtzatton
_ - threat ts generally stmple. Most have a stngle cause suchas penetration by
debris or a failed (open or leaking) barrier or valve to the vacuumoutside.
A complexthreat has multiple causative elements. Fire, for example,
generally requires fuel oxidizer and an ignition source. Themotivation for
making the distinction in classification of threats as simple or complex
arises largely from the complexity of the fix, or strategy. Clearly, the
simple cause can more easily be accommodatedthan a threat which has several
elements in each cause. Complexthreat_, require complex strategies.
The grouping of threats as personal (involving individual crew personnel
_- such as a crewmanor EVA) as opposedto community, in which the entire station
: .... has an exposure to risk provides an aid to operational planning. ".
L: Whethera threat is time-dependent or spontaneousis a major
_-. consideration in Alternate Strategy Development. The time available to
k ingress an escape vehicle is one of the major discriminators as to whether
:" escape is a vtable concept. Whena threat is a natural one, such as radiation
_: fromsolarflares,mostof the stationhardwareand personnelare involvedin
the strategy.The samemay be truefor station-inducedthreats,suchas
,_-.: particulate cont.mtnatton, but the consequencesare far less severe for the
:e " str_tegy perspectt ve.
- A complete listing of threats, as shownin Table 2-4, was used for this
_ study. This 1tst ts a composite of Rockwell experience, augmentedby a
i dozen-oddreviews and presentations to groups composedof the NASA,
competitors and safety specialists.
.. These threats were also considered from the standpoint of their
_ potentlzlimpacton configurationsolutions. Effortfor this study, being
-: limited by resources, was focused on those threats which would have the
"_ -................ greatest Influence in configuration selection. The eight threats thus
selected are indicated in Table 2-4.
L-
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r._- Table2-4 SPACESTATIONCREWSAFETYTHREATLIST
o Firr
• Leakage
t:|_I- _ l'umbLt_/Loss of Cont,rolo B'lologic¢1or ToxicContamination• o In,luw/Iklne
Gr_,ztrig/Col1t sion
..
-+ Corrosion
Mecahantcal Damage
o Explosion
P.... o Loss of Pressurization
o Radta?,ion
•- Out-of-Control IVA/EVAAstronaut
Inadvertent Operations
Lack ot' Crew Coordination
Abandonmentef Space Station
ElectricalShock
o Heteorot d Penetration
.... S_oFes/Consumables Depletion
Intrust on/Attack
Structrual Erosion
.m Orbit Oecay
•-. ........ Lossof Access to a Hatch
_ TemperatureExtremes
- o Debrls
Free Orbit (EVAAstronaut)
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STRATE61ES
A strategy is an approachused to achieve resolution of a threat or a
key safetyissue. Thereare rareInstanceswherea singl.estrategy__lll
sufficein the threatmll;igatlonprocess,-For example,a bumperor shieldmay
- be usedto protectagainstmlcrometeroidpenetration.The majorityof
strategies,however,encompassmultlplefacets.
An exampleof thisis thatthe stepsone wouldtakein makinga fire
) improbableby breakingtwo 'legsof the "firetriangle"greatlyenhancesthe
reductionof explosionpotentlalby similarlyaffectingthe "explosion
"_ penta-ring".One addedconsiderationis t_atstrategieschosenmay oftenhave
i. synergisticeffects. Thissynergism ay appeareither(rsa positive
(beneficial)factoror a negativeone.
Strategiesmay fallintocategoriesof eitherdesignsolutions,
operational solutions or safety devices with contingency procedures. Often
the most effective strategy is a combination of two or more of the above. A
generalrule-of-thumbfor strategyapplicationis to firstbuilda "first
line-of-defense"for the threatto precludedamageto personnelor tile
' vehicle. Then,-assumethatthe threatwas not effectlvely_nitigatedanI"
ii developa "secondllne-of-defense"whichpresumesthe existenceof the threatand design for the station and personnel to accommodatethe threat
consequences.
'" i
;-- The idealsolutionfor a giventhreatmay not be realisticfroma total
-"- stationperspective.Thus,each_trat_gymust,of necessity,weigh the
follm#Ingfactors,as a minimum. (I)Synergisticreactionwithother
I_ strategies,(2) Compatibilitywith stationsafetyphilosophy,(3) Flexibilityfor stationgrowthor expansion,(4) Economicfeasibility,(5)Technicalrisk,:4
i and (6) Humanfactorsimpact.
L
: CRITERIADEVELOPMENT
F '.--
_'- A criterionis a designor operationalmeansto controlan individual
:__ threat, The primarypurposeof the criteriais to providea sourcefor both
.:: designand operatlonalrequirementsin a mannerthatis easilyincorporated
_ . into conceptual tradeoffs and configuration selection studies. Once the
r : safety philosophy has been selected, the criteria are largely determined by
:' this philosophy. Figure 2-2 showsthis sche.matically by highlighting the I
"" threadfromthe philosophyand the threats(derivedindependently)to i
criteria,strategies,and requirements.
SAFETY
"" ' IMPORTANCE
".'" OF PROGRAN THREATS DEVICES&
... TECHNOLOGIES
"" PHILOSOPHY CRITERIA STRATEGIES DESIGII
":." eHOMMUCH eHONTO COIJlll'ER eRAYSTOMEET REQUIREMENTS
SAFETY EACHTHREAT CRITERIA
, . ---
OPERATIONAL
: ; REQUIREMENT5
Figure2-2 Sequenceof StudyOutputs ._
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i_ RISK ASSESSMENT/ACCEPTANCE
_i._ The process of acceptinga risk, is a formal techniqueused for each
_. individualhazard that is not e]imlnatedor otherwise resolved. The
I priorities for hazard reduction are shown in Figure 2-3. These are: first,
design to preclude, then design to control, then operationalworkaround, and,
finally, define the residual hazards. For the residuals (i.e.,ones that are
left over), one generallytries to solve the threat with one or more
:..... strategies:I) Where adequate strategiesdo not exist nor does a technology
exist to accommodatethe hazard, (or if the technologyexists, but it is too
,: costly to accommodatethe hazard), 2) that an occurrence is a highly
• improbable(note that it is still a hazard, still a threat, but it's happening
is not judged to be that probable). The last considerationis one where the
consequencehas limited impact. Clearly, categorizationeach of these is
_, subjectiveand is a judgemen_ca11 and not somethingwhere precise guidelines
_ exist, For example,most members of society have accepted the risk of being
_i near 120 volt outlets in their homes or sitting near automoblle-fueltanks
!i that have gasolinewhich, if in vapor phase, Is several times more destructive
than an equivalentmass of TNT. Aircraft and spacecraftoperatorsaccept
_-_
• _imilar risks on a routine basis. For example, a11 of the space shuttle
!:! ,!ightshave been made without benefit of a rescue capability.
i!•
"I
- THREATREDUCTIONPRECEDENCE ACCEPTEDRISKLISTING
• i
- • DESIGNTOPRECLUDE • NOTECHNOLOGYEXISTS
TOACCOMMODATEH ZA_
" " • DESIGNTOCONTROL • TOOCOSTLYTO
.. ! NAZApj)I,,m [_ ACCOII_ODATEH ZARD
• OPERATIONALWORKAROUND •TOOIMPROBABLEAN
OCCURRENCE
! •RESIDUALTHREATS • LIMITEDIMPACT
T-
l l l l
-. Figure 2-3 AcceptanceRisk Discriminators
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3. SPACESTATIONBASELINE
The baselinespacestationusedin thisstudy,was the Rockwell
InternationalConfigurationInexistenceat contractinitiationin January,
1983. (ReferenceSSD 83-0032-2,Pg_ 69-84). ItsSpaceStationarchitecture
is describedin thissection. The modularelementst11atmake up eachof the
station concepts are also described as are the standardized module
_ construction concepts. The station butld-up sequencefor each station
_- arrangement is also tncluded in the description.
INITIALSPACESTATIONARCHITECTURE
" Architecturaldevelopmentof the Initlal SpaceStation considerstwo
categories:externalarchitectureand internalarrangementsof the basic
configurationand standardizationof the constructionof themodular
eleme.ts. Internalarrangementsweredevelopedthatfulfillthe habitable
needsof the initialfour-ma,crew,and at the sametime,minimizethe scan
thatmay resultwhen the initialstationprogressesto the full-up
architecture.
[ Configuration of the pressurized basic station elements evolved from a
standardized moduleconcept that opted for commondiameters, bulkheads,
_ envlronmentalprotectlon, floor1ocations,and docklng/berthing interfaces.
The pressurized modulesare of monocoquealuminum,welded for minimum
leakage. Each module is two standardized end cones and a center cylindrical
• section. A standard segment that contains four standard interfaces is also
_ii!.. ' .... available. Thestandardinterfacesarealsotncorporatedtntheendcones.
The cylindrical sections feature standard struc'cural rings 7 inches deep,
which allow handling the modulesduring manufacturing and transportation and
"_ - are of sufficient depth to allow installation of the environmental shieldIT)J._- within a 14-foot outside diameter envelope. A standard floor location was
,; ..: also tncoporated into the tnternal arrangements.
•.b .,
"t In the habitablevolumeabovedeck,an 82-1nchhighaisleis provided,
,,. which will allow the simultaneous passageof two pressure-suited crew members
:_, - in an emergencycondition. In the equipmentsectionbelowthe floor,the
_i aisle is 40-incheswide,whichprovidesfor a pressure-suitedcrewmanto
°_
_ . performmaintenanceoperations.Bothaislewidthsare compatiblewith the
identifiedequipmentenvelopesizes.
• A false ceiling in each modulecontains the lighting fixtures and air
_ i supply registers. The space behind the false ceiling contains wiring and air
reci rculatton subsystemducts.
An t nt 9rated environmental prot ctt on subsystemconsistt n9 of meteoroid
"i':_ protection,thermalcontrolradiatorsand insulation,and radiationprotection
_ -- was provided on each module.The standard docking/berthing interface accommodatesmodulemating,F_ orblter-to-stationmating,and usermodule/palletmatingto the station. It
features standard mechanical alignment and latching provisions and a standard
_, _. utilitiesinterfacearrangement.A 30-inchby 40-1nchclearopeningprovides
for passageof equipment and pressure-suited crewmen. All the utility
_ : interfaces are remotelyactivated after completing and verifying the
• :._ !
,_:_,"_--_ I,I.'I,:(]I'])INGpAF)I',I;I,M,!KNOt' FII,MI,',D
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i)_- mechar,tcal mating. In addition, a_l-connectlons feature manual override
, provisions pemitt_!n9 servicing or maintenance to be performed by either a
. shiri;sl_eve or a pressure-suited crewman.
: Other crew safety requirements are fulfilled by dividing the Space
Station into two fndepende,t pressure volumes, each capable of serving as an
:: emergency safe haven for the entire crew. Safety features and characteristics
_ of both pressure volumes are summarized in Figure 3-1. A pressure bulkhead
• wtttlln the commandmodule separates the two volumes. Volume I contains the
" energy module, the fonvard end of the commandIblodule and the logistics module.
: The aft end of the commandmodule is in Volume I I.
•" InitialStation Configuration
'_ , The elements that make up the initial Space Station are the utility
module, the commandmodule, two atrlocks, the logistics module, and the
=.., payload service assembly. One atrlock is mounted on the energy module and tile J
_ _ _ other on the crew module, thus providing EVA egress from either pressure
.... VO1ume.
!,, ,.
k::i I:" TWOVOLUMECONCEPT ]
F"_-.. " _ uoou":s
) _,." ..........
UV_Ii UTILITY
i .oDD,,]'--t ......
• *_:-_ m.un-.J..._..L _ _ "DOGEINO
•' " DULKHEAD_ d_T)_ AOAPTER&
,,. CLOIUfl_AmLOC K
DOCKIH" )" I I
ADAPTER&
DERTHINO I I
PAYLOAD
• lEflVlCi
.... : - ADDY
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.. Figure 3-1 Initial Baseline Space Station Arrangement for Crew Safety
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_', Energy Hodule. The energy module provides the source
"i
main of electrical i
,.. power for the SpaceS1;a.t!on. It is constructed in accordancewith the
standardized concept having coneends and a cylindrical center location that
contains four mating ports. Hating ports are also provided at each end of the
energy module. The overall length of the module is 20 feet; tim maximum
_ inside diameter of the center section ts 164 inches (13 feet 8 inches).
. Peripheral rings between the 90-Inch-long center section and each cone end are::, 178 inches in diameter. The moduleis of welded aluminumwith external
meteorotB bumperand Insulation.
The internal structure consists of two bulkheads for equipmentmounting,
one at each end of the center section. Equipmentmountedwtthtn the module
includes fuel cells, electrolysis units and electrical power conversion, and
distribution components. The contFol momenta_ros and their associated
computer and tnerttal measurementunits are also mountedin the energy
module. Docking radar and communicationequipment ts mountedin one end of
the module.
Four reaction control engine modulesare mountedon one cone end with
Ii-i'_:ii: provision for shtrtsleeve servtctng from inside the energy module.
The reaction control subsystempropellant storage and accumulator tanks
are mountedoutside the energy modulearound the cone ends, All internally
mountedequipment is accessible from a 40-inch-wide aisle for service or
'_:: removal and replacement. Electrical, fluid, air, and gas lines to other
_ !_:i modules, externally mountedequipment, and to a dockedorbiter are provided
.. throughthe interfaceconnectionsat thematingports. Air circulatlonIs
- providedthroughthe interface_dththe commandmodule,assistedby fans
internalto the energymodule.
I ....
_ . Stationaccessto the orbiterin its normaldockedlocationis through I
the energy module.
The four berthing ports on the center section are interfaces for t_o
solar arrays, a deployable radiator and an atrlock, all detachable and
• packageablewithinone orbitercargobay. The initialsolararrays,which
. providea totalof 50 kW of power,are replacedfor the growthconfiguration
: oy arraysthatprovideI00 kW of power.
• CommandHodule. The commandmodule is of a similar construction as the
l _ l'll energy nmduleexcept its longer center section contains two segmentsof four
" berthing ports each a,d a cylindrical section. Its total length ts 40 feet.
:_!"::i The volumeabove deck houses staterooms, hygiene facilities, galleys, dining/
. ward room,and medlcal/exerclsefaclllty.A11 of theseprovisionsare
• removablefor the growthphase. A stationoperationsconsolealsolocated
• within this volumeremains throughout the ltfe of the station. The volume
- below deck is used primarily for subsystemequipment.
A combinedinternal arrangement of both the energy and commandmodules
.... provides two independent pressure volumes. Each volumehas an independent
.- environmental control and life support subsystemcapable of supporting both
•:-: volumes. Redundantstation control consoles are located in each volume. The
main staterooms are in VolumeII with back-up sleep stations in Volume I.
00000001-TSC08
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• - PayloadService Assembly(PSA). The PSAis the principal element of the
t Space Station on which most of the payload servicing activities will take
" place. The service bay will be utilized in a similar capactt¥ as the orbiter
I ,L payload bay (i.e., for servicing free flyers, housing research experiments on
pallets, storing spares, etc.). The back side of the service bay is the
• service fixture where a mobi!e _nipulat;or ann and two sets of payload
" . . retention devices on carriage assemblies are featured. The service fixture
: will be utilized for servicing OTV's. The two retention devices will allow
L: simultaneous servicing of two OTV's. In that event, the service fixture
_. manipulator ann is complementedby the service bay manipulator ann in
servicing the OTV's. Both manipulators are operated by crewmenwithin the
control module, which is permanently attached to the se_vtce bay structure.
., :, The control stations simulate the Shuttle aft deck from where the RMSis
.- controlled arid operated. Observation windows similar to those of the Shuttle
are also provided. The otherend of the PSAfeatures a mating portwhere
: incoming OTV's dockfor subsequenttransfer to the service fixture for
.: servicing. The service fixture manipulator ann is used for OTVtransfer to
the service fixture.
L"
:: Logistics Hodule
._ The logistics module assumesthe samebasic exterior configuration as
.ie .: the other pressurized elements. This includes standard end cones, frames,
_- cylindricalbodysection,end interfaceports. A matingportis attachedto
- one end conewhilea pressureplatesealsthe secondend cone. On the
i periphery of the secondend cone, a structural skirt is attached to protect i: L.' 1
_.::.- external tank installation provisions. The total length of the logistics j
". module is 23 feet. i'
-- Inside the logistics module are two structural bulkheadsthat coincide
with the external frames. In the center of each bulkhead is a 40-incho.
diameter opening. On both sides of each bulkhead, pie-shaped, 20-inch-deep
: storage compartmentswith hinged doors are mounted to provide the majority of
storage space. Storage compartmentsare also provided on the end cones. On
the near end cone, lO-inch deep by 50-inch wide compartmentsare mounted
-- around the periphery. On the far end cone, a 48-inch-diameter by 24-inch-
deepfreezer is provided. Aroundthe freezer, additional storage compartments
_ are mounted. The internal arrangement features 36-inch-wide aisles betweeen
: - storage compartmentsand betweeneach storage compartmentand the end cone.
This width is sufficient for opening storage compart_nentdoors and for
crev_nen,carrying supplies, to easily maneuver. Of the total logistics module
internal volumeof 2,565 cubic feet, 1,014 cubic feet are available for
- storage, which satisfies the average requirements for a 90-day resupply period
for an eight-member crew.
GROWTHSTATIONARCHITECTURE
. The growth SpaceStation, designed to provide a habitable and working
: environment for a crew of eight, is assembledby building on to the inttia 1
. SpaceStation. Thecore station modulesaddedare. Habitat Hodule 1, Habitat
Module2, and a ltfe sciences module that interconnects the two habitat
modules. Thesemodulesare arranged, as shownin Figure 3-2, to provide two
.- exits out of each occupied area and to provide dual independent volumesfor
- emergencysafe havens.
:_ 30 ,_ )_
_:,_ •..... .. _ ,
00000001-T$C09
_qek_
i..
" VOLUMEII VOLUMEI _:
_i' ' ' I HABITAT MODULE NO. 2 _ HABITAT MODULE NO. 1 J
_'_._ • SIATIONOP_RATIOlii8CONT_ CONSOLE * POIMARTGALLEY- _I-OAYSUPPLYFROM
SACKUPGALLEY|21.nATSUPPLY) LGOISTICSMOOULEHYGIENEF CILITY • HYGIENEFACILITY
• I_(MARTMEOIOALFACILITY • SACKUPMEDICALFACILITY
_ii ' • ECLSSFACIUTY • ECLSSFAC,LITY,_ . • SLEEPSTATION • SLEEP TATION
_,"_C° NATC.n_ • WORKS.OP/LAOS
; "" " [COMMAND MODUI:,E _ SECTION MOOULE,J
L . . SECONDARYELECT ------_u'JA_ • PRIMARTfSECONOAflY
:.,"', POWER ELECTPOWER
: ORBITERDOCKINGf ORBITERDOCKING
-- PORT PORT
t, ' • .
. .,.-
.... ImlSSlJRt COREMOOUL
... BULKHEAD SPACF3P__:NTROLCONSOLE
" • PANTRY-
NOMINALSUPPLIES
• '" + 21.PAYEMEROENCY
.... SUPPLIES
. ' Fi.qure3-2 Baseline Space Station Concept Arrangementfor Crew Safet_
.°
'.." ,-
-!
-°i 3i
• • .. ..
-........ O[..)UUUUU'I /,.%bl U------"'-"-""""
GrowtilStation Configuration
The standardmodular constructionelements describedearlier are used
for the 4O-fQot-longhabitat modules. The interior floor location, aisle
widths, false cellihg, end integratedenvironmentalprotectionsubsystemare
also incorporated. The structural arrangement of Lhe life sciences module is
_: ldenCtca! to the commandmodule except that the pressure bulkhead separating
Volume I and Volume II is not required.
.. The internal arrangementsand ._=_=_°_+......• _.L..,_,,._,_.,_..._ _._,'..._,_ _-n,
this section. The build-up s_quence from the initial station architectureto
the growtllstation arrangementis also described.
Habitat Module I. Located in the living/worklngarea of this module are
four crew staterooms,the galley, a dining/wardroom/quletrecreation
facility,a hygiene facilitywithout a shower, and a larger volume, 490 cubic
feet, identifiedas a workshop/laboratoriesfacility. The requirementsfor
this facilityhave not been fully defined. Each stateroom, nominally
accommodatingone crew member, has the capabilityto accommodatetwo during
overlap or emergency. The requiredcomponentsof the subsystemare located in
the equipment bay below the floor. The end cones provide storage for
i infrequentlyneeded items and access to the interfac_connectors.
..... Habit"a_cIbdule 2. Located in the living/workingvolume of this module
are four new stateroomsof the same configurationand capability as those
_ located in Habitat Module I, a back-u_ -alley with 21-day food storage
capability,a medlcal/exercisefacility, a full hygiene facility including a
shower, and a control center containingthe station operationsconsole. The
subsystemequipment is located in the equipment bay. Similar to Habitat
i_" Module I, the end cones provide storage for infrequentlyneeded items and
access to the interfaceconnectors.
"'" Life Science Module. This module is divided into b¢o volumes by
. partitionsabove and below the floor. The resultingareas are utilized for
life science research (animals)and _edical research (humens). A slight
pressure differentialbetween the volumes will contain any animal odors. The
researchfacilitiesare located in the working volume above deck. Only the
air circulationequipment has been identified,to date, to support this
" facility. Consequently,the equipment volume below the floor is available for
the installationof special equipment or storage. Tlleend cones provide
storage for four emergency escape subsystemsand other infrequentlyrequired
items as well as access to any interfaceconnectors.
Command t4odule. The command module will have all of the crew
habitabilityprovisions,such as crew staterooms,hygiene facilities,galleys,
and dining/wardroomremoved after the build-up _as been completed. Also
removed will be the medical/exerclsefacility and the back-up station
operationsconsole. All of these facilitiesare now contained in Habitat
Modules 1 and 2. The scar wiring and plumbing lines will remain. The
subsystemcomponentsin the equipment bay are retainedto maintain the
. redundancyand safety requirements. The space now available in tileliving/
. working volume can be utilized for laboratoriesand workshups,which have yet
• ., to be defined.
!.
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i .... 4. SCENARIOS "
'
i ..°,
i Duringthisst.u_dyfivescenarioswereselectedas thosewhich typify
high riskspac_estat_iQ.nactivities,Thesescenariosare spacestation
•..: activities,and:
I. SpaceStationBuild-up
2. Berthing
.. 3. HaterialProcessing
:. 4. FluidTransfer
: 5. ExtraVeilicularActivity
IF,; The ExtraVehicularActivityIs dlscus,cedseparatelyin Section6 of
"- thisvolume.
i[ -".
_i !''" APPROACtlEachscenariowas addrussedusingthe 1oglcshownin Figure 4-I. Tile
'i objectivewas to identifysafetycriticaltasksand relatedhardware,where
:_ applicable,in orderto developsafetycriteriaano guidelinesfor space
station design and operations. In looking at each of these scenarios the
__. o
,. : relatedthreatswerethe studydrivers. Thesethreatsare sllownin Table4-1.
" TABLE4-1 SPACESTATIONCREWSAFELY ]
_- ' " THREATLI ST
__ :.- o Fire
; ;- o Leakage
_-, " o Tumbling/Lossof Control ,
..; o Biologicalor ToxicContamination
-_;.- o Injury/Illness
o Grazlng/CollIslon
,-. o Corrosion
• " o l,lechanlcalD mage
: o Explosion
o Lossof Pressurization
"- o Radiation
-" o Out-of-Control IVA/EVAAstronaut
o Inadvertent Operations
•;- . o Lackof CrewCoordination '.
• o Abandonmentof SpaceStation
' _ o ElectricalShock
I " o MeteoroidPenetration
, -- o Stores/ConsumablesDepletion
' o Intrusion/Attack
" " ; o StructuralErosion
•" o OrbitDecay
" o Loss of Accessto a Hatch
_ o Temperature Extremes
o Debris
o Free Orbit (EVAAstronaut)
4
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qThe scenario study sub-tasks w__.r.-conducted as fullo_s:
I. Study logic per Figure 4--rl.
'-- 2. Prepare.the scenarlQ task logic diagrams
3. IdentifySafety Critical tasks
4. Prepare a task/criteria/guidelinesmatrix
"" The product of this sub-study expands the safety criteria and guidelines. files.
.., Scenario assess_ent for this study was llmi..t_e.dto .gro..ss..tas_k.........................
;.:._-...............deffnItion. Tileunderstandingis that a detailed scenario task plan will be
.. developedeventually for each defined activity. Assuming that Figure 4-2
typifies the approach taken to develop scenario task plans, a risk assessment
would be made for each sub-task block. Hopefully,the safety criteria and
/ -- guidelines developedunder this study would be an adequate safety baseline to
•. provide guidance for task development.
' SPACE STATION BUILD-UP
L- - The assumed sub-task elements of tilespace station build-up scenario and
E " their relationshipsare shown in Figure 4-3. To ensure that the defined
build-up tasks are credible, full-scale,high-fidelitydry-runs are required.
F- A fallout of this approach implied in Figure 4-2 is a detail task _lan. The
_,-" plan is tiletool used for detailed risk assessmentof the eventually defined
... bu_.ld-up scenario.
Ti.- The safety critical tasks, earti_-side,are not too different from those(_ncounteredin day-to-daysiluttleoperations. Basic requirementsfor the
.;:- shuttle related ground and flight safety critical tasks are contained in
• IIHBI7OO.7Aend KHB 1700.7. The build-up pecul_ar segmentsbegin (See Figure
. 4-3) with "Place in Orbit". The Table 4-2 matrix addresses each of tile
).. a,s_eriskedsub-tasks,the applicablethreats, and related criteria and
_.'. guid_.lineslisted in Vol. IV.
m_
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'" " TO HAZARD.S J THE CRITERIONFOR
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/"' =" BERTHING
I>../.
- ..":. By definil:ion, a..bert4zin9 p_s consists of all operations., necessary._
-.-_ .- to join two independent orbitin9 units into one independent unit. In this
• "". • study, one of the two independent units is the Space Station. The ott_er unit
:- can be Shuttle Orbiter, OTVIOHV, or other vehicles.
_ The berthing process becomes essential in supportingthe Space Station.
Logisticsand personneltransfer,whether it is of routine or emergency/rescue
" nature, can be accomplishedthrough the bertllingprocess.
Also, the berthing process is a very safety-crlticaloperation.
-" Previous berthing operationson both the Gemini and the Apollo programs have
• been c.onduc.tedwith high _gree of success; however, the berthing problems
encountereaon tlleApollo 14 flight and on the Russian Salyut/Soy;_zmission
Space Shuttle Orbiter to be_n to the Space Station could lead not only to
loss of the station, but also of the on-board crews (if, for instance, EVA
were not possible). Therefore,berthing is a very critical operation and
requires a thorough safety analysis.
Out of many bertllingconcepts proposed,the followingconcepts appear to
_ .. be usable:
_ I) Direct berthing (hard berth)
_'_' 2) Extendabl• tunnel berthing (soft berth)
-
_. 3) Berthing to the Space Station holding frame
;- Tlledirect berthingconcept, Figute 4-4, does not require Remote
_._). ManipulationSystem (RMS) assistance. The active element (fo_ instance,the
. Shuttle Orbiter)makes the initial contact, berthing port to berthing port,
_ without intermediateassistance; the integrally attached berthing mechanisms
. make contact for initial capture. Tiledirect berthing concept requires the
• -- dissipationof relativelylarge energy levels because of the coarse velocity
control expected for propulsivemaneuvers of the large masses involved. The
. concept was employed during Apollo-Soyuzmission; the berthing operationwas
-- perfo_ed by aligning the mass centers of the tvlovehicles.v
i The extendable tunnel berthing concept, Figure 4-5, uses an extension
_ • mechanism, The berthingmechanism, on one of the two berthing vehicles,
i , extends some distanceaway from the vehicle before ef_ctlng initial contact
i " and capture. After the capture, the mechanism is then retracted to draw thetwo vehicles togetllerfor rigidizing. The distinguishingfeatures of the
-:_ extezstabletunnel berthing concept are: I) it provides a long separation
distance of two vehicles at tMe instanceof first contact, 2) it provides
stability after capture and during retraction;3) it affords a long stroke,
low stiffnessattenuationcapabllty. RHS use becomes optional for this
)r -- concept.
The berthing-to-holding-frameconcept uses an open-centerho'Idingframe
'. on the Space Station. Retractablebooms from the frame draw and lock the
Shuttle Orbiter to the holding frame. A good analogy would be a shlp (the
•" Orbiter) berthing to a pier (the holding frame). This concept does not
. require _IS assistance.
.'.. ;
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..... In this study, we have chosen the direct berthing concept to demonstrate
HI: "- our scenario screening process. The assumed sub-task elements that comprise
._. tl_e bertl_tng scel_io flow are s_own tn Ftguee 4-6. The asterisked sub-task
•. elements are considered safety critical _asshown in Table 4-3, Indicating the
B "- applicable threats. An assessment was made of each of these safety critical
tasks to ensure the proposed safety criteria and guidelines are present. As
" an accommodateng st,raCegy,_ tile Table 4-4 Rtsk Assessment Matrix summarizes the
,-: task-criteria guideline relationships.
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; HATERIALPROCESSING
_.....:.' The possibleindustrialization.ofspacehas beenone of themost
_ _ provocativeand stimulatingconceptsoi:tie UnitedStatesSpaceProgram. This
.... excitingconcepthasgenera_t_eda largenumb_atof spaceIndustelalization
,_..... projectsthatare noteasilyreallzableon earth.
._...
:..:._ Oi_ of the suggestedprojectsis spacemanufacturingof uniqueproducts
...., .i and materialsfor earthuse or for use in orbit. Spaceoffersthe potential
'_ formakingnew or novelproducts,or forprocessingmaterialsthatcan be used
:: on earthto make new,betteror lowercost producLs.The presenceof a low
" gra,ityenvironmentof spaceenablesus to processmaterialsmore efficiently
_ .. and effectivelythanon earth. A microgravityenviro_nent,witllrespectto
• materialprocessing,impliesan absenseof convection,sedimentation/buoyancy,
,:- and body force pressures.
i Initialeffortsto studymaterialprocessingin a low gravity
environmentstartedin the I960's. Engineerstriedto studywhat effects
_ ....L low-gwould haveon peopellantsin rocketstagesthatwerecoastingbetween
'_'•.. burnsand on metalthatwas moltenforweldlngin buildinglargestructures.
_-..!_ This developedintoa basictestprogramusingaircraftand a droptubeto
., study basic phenomenain a few secondsof low-g. Then three Apollo flights
carried equipment for casting immiscible metals and refining certain types of
..... " cells. From this there evolved a larger program to be conductedaboard the
I _ Skylab during 1972-73. Successled to more low-g experiments aboard the US
.'.:: half of the Apollo-Soyuz missions in 1975. Currently,we are conducting
. materialprocessingexperimentsaboardthe Slluttle/Spacelab.Suchexperiments
• include 14onodisperseLatex Reactor (14LR),ContinuousFlow Electrophoresis
System(CFES),and various experiments as Get AwaySpecial (GAS) payloads.
._'_"" Fromthe informationproducedby the previousexperiments,we are ableto
.: selectthoseexperimentsthatllavegreatereconomicpotentialand utilityto
.d
- mankind.
-'" Tileapplicationsfor materialprocessedin spaceinclude,to date,a
'. wide wriety of electronic,optical,and biologicaluses. Analysisof
..... previousexperlmen_sand currentplanseor futureeffortssuggeststhat
initialcommercialventureswill probablybe associatedwith the productionof
" electronicmaterial,glasses,and bi°1°gicaluProductS'de:For example,the
" productsthatexhibitgreaterpotentialIncl
: I) Near-perfectGall!u_nArsenide(GaAs)integratedcircuits
2) Exoticglassesfor fiberoptics;
"-. 3) Interferon (_ promisingbiomedicine)
i Spacestatior,offersan excellentopportunityfor us to advanceto
_..-. fu11-scaleproductionphaseof materialprocessing,culminatingin commercial
manufacturing.The SpaceStationprovidesseveral1ocatlonoptionsfor
materialprocessing:I) insidethe station;2) outsidethe station.-with
,. processing equipmentsattached to the station; 3) outside the station - as a
- co-orbitlngfreeflyer. For example,MLR and CFES belongto the firstoption;
: ; GAS-typeexperiments to the secondoption; experiments mountedon Long
Duration ExposureFacility (LDEF) to the last option. Regardless of their
• locations, a_.l material processing experiments pos_tbly need sometype of crew
- involvement.For instance,GAS-typeexperimentsmight requireEVA while
i: LDEF-typeexperimentsmight needEVA usingl,|anHaneuveringUnit (I_4U)or an
OrbitalTransferVehicle(OTV).
47 ,J
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1._- In thisstudy,we havegenerateda t)picalmaterialprocessingscenario,
_" as shownin Figure4-7,in orderto demonstrateour sc_enarioscreening
process. Thlsgen_rlcscenariois mainlybaseduponthe activitiesInvolved
]_ -,. in _onducting the CFES experiment. Table 4-5 rela_ tilethreats to task sub-
'. elements. Table 4-6 contal,s the risk a_sse_55mentmatte_x.
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'i FLUID TRANSFER
i_:" " Orbital fluid transfer operations play a critical role in supportingthe
_: ' Space Station and in carrying out a "Cluid-depot"function of the Space
_ " Station. The fluids that can be transferredto and from the Space Station
.... range from drinking water to propellants. Table 4-7 contains a list of
.: ._ candidate fluiJs. As snowA in Figure 4-8, tilereare various vehicles that can
i- " interfacewith the Space Station during fluid transferoperations.
_ Table 4-7. LIST OF CANDIDATE FLUIDSFOR ORBITAL FLUID TRANSFER
PROPELLANT LIQUID HYDROGEN(LH2}
.. LIQUID OXYGEN (LO2)
: MONOI,IETHYLHYDRAZINE
NITROGEN TETROXIDE (N2O4)
-" HYDRAZINE (N2H4)
6 "::)" PRESSURANT NITROGEN(GN2);./ HELIUI,I(He)
. "ECLSS"TYPE BREATHINGOXYGEN (GO2)
_: . FREON
_-,. NITROGEN(GN2) ,
_ ........ WATER (DEIONIZED)
_ " WATER (POTABLEAND WASTE)
(
i> MISCELLANEOUS I CLEANINGFLUIDS
Three differentfluid transfer techniquesare considered in this study.
The techniquesare: l) transfer-via-condultstechnique;2) fluid module
exchange technique;3) hand-carried-cannistertechnique.
The transfer-via-conduitstechnique,ilIustrated in Figure 4-9, uses
.- conduits (for excmple, pipes and hose) as fluid transfer lines. This
technique requires either Remote Manipulator System (RI_S)assistance or ExtraVehicularActivt} (EVA) in connecting a fluid transfer line from a supply tank
on the suppliervehicle to a matc ing receiver tank on the r ceiver vehicle.
The techniquealso requires a fluid transfer llne for each fluid to be
transferred. It is to be determinedwhether to transfer one fluid at a time
or to transfer several fluids simultaneously. The latter requires some sort
of systematiccontrol in connectingseveral fluid lines so as to eliminate any
• confusion.
Insteadof connecting lines between the two vellicles,we can directly
_!_ exchange fluid modules. The fluid module exchange technique, shown in Figure
4-1O, uses a i_inimumof two RMS's to replace an empty fluid module (EM) on the
receiver vehicle with a refill fluid module iRH) on the suppliervehicle. The
techniquehas tisefolowing constraints: I) module exchange activitiesmust
O0000001-TSE02
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take place within the reach of the RMSs;2) a proper design of interface
_ dtscowlects between the module and the receiver vehicle is necessary; 3) a
proper scheduling of fluid consumptionshould be madeto detemtne the size of
each fluid tank so as to minimize-the.weight penalty involved during the fluidr
i_," resu_ly. Also, this technique requ.lr_s modular_zatton of the fluid storage
i system of future vehicles including the SpaceStation.
F
The simplest of all is the hand-carried-cannister technique. As the
_ nameindicates, astronauts handcarry cannJ:.t_rs containing the fluids such as
_' water, freon, etc. Design requirements for these cannisters are subject to
i: :_ " the environment in which the transfer is taking place. For example, designers
' .... must take into account the pressure differential generated from the "vacuumof
_.:: space if the transfer requires EVA.
i In general, fluid transfer operations between the two vehicles may not
require berthing. Astronauts can accomplish fluid transfer operations while
• tile two vehtcles rendezvousin cl se pr ximity; th vehtcles must be withi
_ . the reach of the PJ4Ss.
_. In this study, we have selected propellant as the transferrod fluid and
; - applied the fluid moduleexchangetecl)nique in generating a scenario. We,
--. then, have analyzed the scenario, delineated in Figure 4-11 and Table 4-8, to
_:: demonstrate our scenario screening process. The scenario t_asthe Orbiter as
_':_'. the suppliervehicleto the SpaceStation. Generally,propellantransfer
_ operationsare consideredone of the morehazardousoperationsencounteredin
orbitalfluidtransferoperations.We can,however,reducethe actualriskto
_ :: a lowerlevelby usingpropersafetycriteriaand guidelines.Table4-g shows
_-. the riskassessmentmatrixwhichcontainsappropriatesafetycriteriaand
" gutdelf.nes. These safety criteria and guidelines are the outcomeof our
_ scenario screening process.
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_-.-:. 5. ESCAPEANDRESCUE
_ I Escape and re_c,_e provisions are a design requirement for any manned
- system. The purpose of this section is to discuss tilevarious escape and
I:. rescue alternativesfor an Orbiting Space Station.
i_i_ TlleSpace Station crew safety tflreatsare discussed in various sectionsin greater detail. They awe listed in Figure ._-Iand are grouped according to
_: whether or not it would reqJire immediateresponse,wPether ti_erewas some
F " delay allowableor a slow response could be encounteredto correct or
_i _" counteracttllethreat. The inset graph illustrates_he comparative "time
until adverse impact" versus "time to repair". If the time to repair is less
_ .......than the time to adverse impact, thet_there is a potentialof controllingor
_ doing somethingabout the threatenedsituation. However, if the reverse is
E true, then the threat situation is one that dictates an immediateneed.
The threats which could result in escape or rescue are presented in-w ....
,'T Figure 5-2. Of those which allow delayed response,escape can be ilandledby
_ - personnel going to a Safe Haven, and can be rescued by the Slluttle.For those
_. tllreatsrequiringan immediate response,the problem is to discern if escape
_ or rescue time is available. If escape or rescue time is not available, the
_-_..._. risk will have to be accepted for threats of these magnitudesbecause if they
_. .- happened, the crew would not be able to escape from them anyway. The ones
that fall into this category would be large fires, large tumbling rates, big
,__:.... explosions,rapid decompressionof multiple volumes,possible metoroid
_ penetration,debris, etc.
E.;:; If escape time is available,then what portion of the crew would most
:" likely be involved? All crew members would probably be involved for tl_reats
_ .:. such as a major fire, explosion,mechanicaldamage, etc. For other threats
such as biologicalcontaminationor depletion of consumables,possibly only
_ _ half of the crew may be involved. However,ti_emedical injury/illnessissue
_ .. is probably the only threat that would require only one crewman to escape or
be rescued. Table 5-I shows the probable causes for less than the full crew
to escape from the space station.
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- ESCAPE AND RESCUE OPTIONS
_,_. Tne options for escape and rescue are divided into 5 categoriesas shownin Figure 5-3. Option A providesemergency escape vehicle(s)at tilespace
sl;ationwhich enables escape tO earth. The actual_escue _s performedby the
: L.: Navy or Air Force. Option B provides an Orbital Transfer Vehicle (OTV) fQrrelocatingthe crew t_ a second station. Spare partsor equipment may be
. obtained for the return and repair of the space station and contlnued
operations_ An external Safe Haven is used in Option C for the crew to await
i " rescue by tileOrbiter or frlendly vellicle,then return to earth. In Option D,
•--_ an InternalSafe Haven is available. The Orbiter or a friendly vehicle can
i .... provide the rescue operations; or a supply vehicle can be _ent for Space
Station repair & resumptionof operations. In Option E, the Orbiter is
I .. available for escape to earth.
• ESCAPE/RESCUEDISCRIMINATORS
The prime discriminatorsfor the escape/rescuesystem options are cost,
" response time, crew size, tecllnologyrisk (new technologiesrequired)and
o,
• are shown on Figure 5-4 along with the discrimlntorassessments. For Optinn
. A, emergencyescape vellicleslocated at station,costs for safety is charged100%, Because of the kinds of vehicles involved,a minimum o two are needed
to be effective. Response time varies from I0 minutes to 1 I/2 hours. The
B crew size varies from 1 to 4 per vehicle. Technology risk ranges from medium
.... to very higli. Some of these concepts have a minimum of analysis and very
little if any developmenttests. The types of calamitiesthat can be
accommodatedar_.siIown. If the crewmen go to a second stat'ion,Option B, no
"_ " costs are charged to safety because the capabi-Mtyis already built into the
..- second station. It is simply a matter of using OTV-for t_ansfer. Time oi"
[,,_. responsewill vary pending the relative positionsof the stations. Technol.ogyrisk is medium, tl_esize of the crew is not known. For the extern31 Safe
_ Haven, Option C; costs would be charged to safety because it is not needed to
' keep the space station operating. Response time would be approximately1
,. hour, crew size could be B people, a very higl_technologicalrisk & it would
_ accommodatethe calamities as sho_m. For the InternalSafe Haven, Option D,
....:_ total costs are a part of the mission continuation. The response time is very
short, risk is lo_._,it can handle all the crew & can accommodatemost of the
r calamities, l'heorbiter Vehicle,Option E, would have no costs for on-station
i, mission continuation. The response time could be as short as 15 minute for
I-. on-station. Otherwise,it depends where the Orbiter vehicle is located at tlle
time of an emergency. The Orbiter could handle a full crew and all calamities
I" includlngthese injury/illnesscases. However,there is a potentialproblem.
In the event of a rescuemission that occurred concurrentlyduring a crew-
changeover (about 16 people plus tlleOrbiter crew), a second orbiter may be
: requiredto handle this condition.
! ESCAPE SYSTEM CONCEPTS
Escape system concepts (OptionA above) which are capable of returning to
_.. earth, fall into two broad classes, ba111stic entry types and lifting - body
"" types. The classificationsare a functionof tileaerodynamiccharacteristics
- (body shape, center of mass, center of pressure and aerodynamiccoefficients).
i ;: The pure ballistic types have a lift over drag ratio (L/D) equal to zero.._ se may be further .subdi idedw thin categoriesof medium and high L/Ds.
[.. The 111ghL/Ds having e^tens ,e range and crossrangedistance to the potential
Ianding area.
. • . ,,_ _
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I_ All escape system concepts are sensitive to crew size, stowage and
deploymentkinematics,orbital endurance,aerodynamiccharacteristics,
-. recoverymode, space station interfacesand degree of independency,and extent
i_ of earth - based Support. Each escape system reviewed@rovlded greater or
i - lesser advantagesand disadvantagesin the sensitivitieslisted; none could
...... satisfy all constraints. For example, storage of rigid heat shields is a
major problem for slngle-placeescape sy_ems. Fo_dable, fully expandableand
. semirigidstructuresare more readily integratedinto space station structures
-" and require 1_ss storage space. They are usually the lightest in weight and
are stowable in packs or-cannisters. However, greater demands and constraints
• are placed on the crewman to erect and deploy the escape. In certain designs,
some or even all of these tasks are accomplishedwithin the distressedspace
• station; in others, a portion or all of the tasks are accomplishedin
._: extravehicularactivities (EVA), In one case, reactiontime requiremeBts
place several limitationson the accomplishmentof on-board tasks, and other
cases, the complex EVA requirementscan place very great or impossibledemands
; (_ on man's capabilitiesto do work unrestrainedin the zero-g environment.
......... Space escape essential functions,overall systems and subsystemsupport
" • requirements,and capabilitiesini}erent o crew survival are shoun in Figure
_ ,.....
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" A ltst of typtcal escape vehtcles _,d_ichwere reviewed is shown on Table
:_i 5-2. The e_¢ape systems capable of being stowed onboard or attaclled to the
space station are listed as deployableor rigid concepts along with the
," company responsiblefor the design concept. These escape systems areillustrated F gures 5-6 tnrou ll5-12. A gen ral descriptionis included
•-" giving informal;ionregarding the number of crewmen il;can accommodate,
•; size/weight,type of recoveryand state-of-the-artin tecilnnlogy.The
. remainingconcepts are listed as "Otiler"and inc-ludethe NASA rescue ball
concept, second station, Shuttle, Hermes and an AF Low G Entry Vehicle.
•7 •
Table 5-2 LIST OF TYPICAL VEHICLES
°,.
DEPLOYABLE RIGID OTHER
AIRMATE (GOODYEAR) MOSES (GE) RESCUE BALL CONCEPT (NASA)
RIB-STIFFENED(ROCKWELL) EGRESS (MMC) SECOHD STATION (ROCKWELL)
._ PARACONE(:4DAC) LIFE RAFT(GE) SItUTTLEMOOSE(GE',, EEOED(LOCKHEED) HERMES
_i " ENCAP 17) SPHERICAL HEAT AF LOW G ENTRY VEHICLESHIELD (ROCKWELL)
k_
_ SAVER (ROCKWELL) APOLLO Ci4(ROCKWELL)
;._ LIFTING BODY (NORTHROP)
r_
tM ,.
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_, France's proposed Hermes manned i,dnishuttlespacecraftis shown in Figure
. _ 5-13 (AviationWeek & Space T_chnology,8/8/83). TileFrench sp:.ceagency CNES
: is evaluatingfuture development(}fthe Heroes for launch on the European
..... Ariane 5 launcherconfiguration. Tids versionwould accolmnodatefour
- crewmembers in tile cockpit and would incorporatea small cargo bay in the
center fuselage se_ction.
The Rescue Ball enclosure, Figure 5-!4, consistsof a pressurizedspilere
. which pen,its rescue of personnel from a disabled vehicleto be transferredto
a rescue vehicleor safe llaven. The enclosure accommodatesone person in
shirtsleeveattire and in the fetus transportposition. NASA developedand
• evaluated three of tileseunits. Ti}eorigi;,alconcept used a PLSS (Portable
•' Life Support System, no longer in production)with an oxygen masl_. The
:;- inflatablesphere is approximately39 inches in diameter, uses Kevlar and
- urethane constructionwith an outside tilermalprotectioncover _nd has a Lexan
window. Rescue activiteswould require transfer via EVA, MI4U,the Orbiter
,- manipulatoror other'means.
Astronautsperfonaing EVA may become separatedfrom their work station
and require rescue. The difficulty in seeing a drifting astronaut suggests
the need for a supplementarytarget. Star (search,tracking and re_cue aid)
was the result of a Northrop study. It consists of an inflatabletarget,
Figure 5-15, equipped with an RF/radar corner reflectorand carried as an item
-." of personalequipment, deployed by a lanyardwhich also iniCiates a radio
_ distress call. The target is designed to house the estronautat his option.
- The 25 feet inflated sphere would be as visibleas a 3D magnitude star at
1,000 nautical miles. The device could be used as a marker for space or
." surface payloads.
_. Ine Sp_ce Station escape/rescuediscriminatorsare shown on Table 5-3.
The concepts are listed with informationwhich provides a basis of comparison
regarding;(I) responsetime, (2) technology risk, percent of calamities
accommodated,(3) crew size, (4) man-rating verification,(5) maturity and (6)
specificcomments. Table 5-4 provides a parametricevaluationof
escape/t_scueconcepts. The comparative informationconsists of ; (1)
; environment,(2) costs, (3) technolo_, (4) developmentrisk, (5) launch
- vehicles and (6) recovery. A review of the above shows that the only fast
L responseis provided by escape to a second station. Most of the
_, . inflatable/foldabletype escape systems have an inherentlyslow response
time. I,,addition, the crewmen requirepressure suits as opposed to having a
- - shirt-sleeveenvironment. With the exceptionof 14osesescape concept, most of
the one to three crewman sized ballistic entry type escape systems have a high
" technologicaland development risk. None of these systems have been man-
_ rated. Although the Moses has a proven maturity record for recovering
unmanned satellitevehicles, it uses a rotationalspin rate to compensate for
_ ; center of gravity (CG) offsets and encounters an axlal decelerationforce of
_ between 7 and 8 G's during atmospheric re-entry. Most of these systems would
_ use a water recovery for landing. The Moses has an air/aircraftrecovery
_ system.
.:.
The only escape/rescuevehiclecapable of providingexceptionallyIGw
.. : re-entry G loads are the lifting body types such as the USAF/Lang_.ey
_-_- (Northrop)lifting body, the proposed French Hermes concept and the Orbiter
'.- Shuttle vehicle. The USAF lifting body has completed a low altitude flight
test program. The Shuttle Orbiter vehicle is tileonly proven 1ow-G entry and
airport runway Ianding vehicie.
.._o .:
.
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i_ " Figure S-14 Rescue Ball Concept (NASA)
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A reviewof the.foregoingdiscussionsrelativeto potentialthreatsand
.: escape/rescuerequlr.ements,howstilatmost threatscan be eliminatedby
designor operationalsolutionswiththe exceptionof injuryor illness. Due
to the hlgnentryG's encountered,the OrbiterShuttlevehicleis tileonly
conceptcurrentlycapableof performingEscapeor Rescueoperationsfor
seriously"Illor Injured"personnel.
"
L"
._ "
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_- 6. EXTRA-VEHICULARACTIVITY
_ii" INTRODUCTION
! i Extra-VellicularActivity(.'VA)is thatactivity conductedexternal to the
. primary shirtsleeveenvironmentafforded by the National Space TransportationSystem (NSTS). the Space Station, any future planned habitabilityareas (OTV
manned pod or Lunar Base habitabilitymodules). The EVA function in the past,
except for Apollo unar surfaceand cis-lunarexploration,has usually been a
contingency ._unctionor an experimentalendeavor to determinecrew
capabilities. For the Space Statio_l,EVA is pla,med as a normal activity.
The contingencyelement of EVA is not defined at this time. The purpose of
tllisreport section is to address the threat impact on EVA crewmen and systems
and discuss current EVA systems and their related safety issues.
".HREAT/EVAIIIPACT
Twenty-fivethreats to the space sta1.ionprogram have been identified
dLming this study. Table 6-I lists these threats and indicates tlleirimpact
or_t_e EVA systems. Each related threat is discussed. Tllreatdefinitionsare
included in Appendix B to Volume IV of this report, lianyof these threats
_': will be addressed,hopefully in the planned advanced Ef4Ustudy for FY85.
Fire
Fire issues that relate to EVA are similar to those discussed in Section 2
of Volume If. Design approachesto preclude the onset of fire are classical,
tllatis, I) proper material selection,2) isolatingthe fuel-oxidizer-ignition
: _riangle legs and/or 3) inert affected volume with a non-volatilegas or by
_ - evacuatingthe volume. Electrostaticcharge, as an ignition element inside
the suit system as well as within the volume where suit storage,maintenance,
donning and clmckout take place should be addressed specificallyas a function
of space station/EVAsystems interfacedesign.
L,_.' Leakage
This tt_reat concerns itself with leakage internal to the system volumes:
the suit system, the ECLSSsystem and the mobility system, The strategies for
!,_" tllreataccommodationare standard industryapproaches" I) careful material
•" selection for faying surfaces, 2) attention to seal selectionfor long life
• material compatibility,3) maintainabledesign allowing ready seal removal,
_- replacementand system pressure checkout in orbit.
.:. Tumbling/Lossof Control
EVA suit systems ar,d EnvironmentControl Systems (ECS) asymmetrical
..... venting and Mobility Systems attitude control runaway are threat issues. The
concerns can be handled with _udicious applicationof subsystem redundant
.!
design.
_
.
B3 _,
_b e_
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T.REAT ,.PACT
" " ..... l"'-E-nV,----I........... F-TooI/-]
[ii,, Suit ] Control Ji,tobilfty I End j
_: S_stem I .System 1 Syst_em._SEffectors$
....... T _ I.........I
[' " l Fire* X X X
":-" 2. Leakage X X X
L
3. Tumbling/Lossof Control X
4. Biologicalor Toxic Contamination* X X
5. Injury/Illness* X X X
. .: 6. Grazing/Collision X X X X
-: 7. Corrosion X X
..:...;. 8. MechanicalDamage X X X
-- 9. Exp|osion* X X
-..- lO. Loss of Pressurizationv X X X
"-, If. Radiation* X
.... 12. Out of Control IVA/EVA Astronaut X
_.•.' 13 InadvertentOperations X
:) .
' 14. Lack of Crew Coordination X
15. Abandonmentof Space Station
,.,. 16. ElectricalShock X X
17. Meteoroid Penetration* X X X
•" 18. Stores/ConsumablesDepletion X X
Ig. Intrusior/Attack X
20. Structural Erosion X X X
•,;- 21. Orbit Decay
22. Loss of Access to a Hatch
23. TemperatureExtremes X X X
24. Debris* X X X
;°
25. Free-Orbit X
.-" *Discussed in Volume II
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Biologicalor ToxicContamination
- Suit system contamination, as well as suit ECSconta_mtnattonare causal
_l_j._-.. factorsin the Injury/Illnessthreat. Growthand sustenanceof pathogenica9entsinmicro-9environmentsare safetyissues_;obe resolved.Thisissue,
" in lookingat the EVA systemas a miceocosmof the largespacestal;ion
. :- community, must be handled in the samemanneras the space .'ration, Theleanl g/dlsinfectinqis a dominantfactorin recommendinga hardsuitdesign
-:: as opposedto a softsuitdesign.
:" Injury/Illness
.
,: : EVA relatedinjury/illnesscausalfactorsincludebends,sharpcorners,
.... motionsickness,stressgeneratedby suitphysicalconstraintsoverextended
periodsof timeon EVA in additionto theotherthreatsdiscussedi'nthis
section.
_" Bends-Present EVAsuit systems in use with the STScenters about a soft
suittechnologywitha 4. psi capability.The ruleof thumbin use todaydiscouragesdepressingthe humanbodyby morethatone halfthe beginning
pressurein mixedgasenvironments.This has requireddepressurizationf the..... o_)ite cabinfrom14.7psi downto 10.2,_sias a precursorto EVA. In
_ . addition,to avoiddenitrogenationf the:EVA subject,pre-breathir_of 100%
_-
_. :. oxygenfor 30 minutesfor males,or 90 minutesforfemalesis undertaken
_. beforeeachEVA. An 8 psi,or higher,EVA suittechnology- suchas thatis
....- in existenceat NASAAmesResearchCenter-woulda11eviateor possibly
eliminatethe riskof bends. A minimumriskapproachwouldbe to use a 14.7
-:. psi EVA suit. The EVA softand hardsuitsare discussedlaterin thissection.
_= SharpCorners- Inspectionof systemsfor damagingprotuberancesand
-,_. abradingcontactpointsis extremelycriticalif today'ssoftsuittechnology
_-- extendsintothe spacestationoperationaltimeperiod. The abilityof a hard
_._. _...............su_o.pre_t the-EVAastronautfromlossof pressuredue to suitpressure
. shellpenetrationwouldminimizethe riskfromsharpcornersand abrading
surfaces.
• o
., MotionSickness- the datafromcurrentSTSflighton thissubjectis not
readilyavailableto the aerospacecommunity,especiallyfor sickness_ithin
" the EVA suit. If thisis a realisticthreatcausalfactorto an EVA
astronaut,thendesignor suitoperationalhazardstrategiesshouldbe
:: investigated.A visualreference,a horizonlineon the suithelmet,and
othersimilarsensorysystemorientationaidsmay be germane.
::: Stress - For day-to-day EVAoperations, as opposedto the one-time
exposuresbeing experienced in current STSEVAoperations, the space-station
=_:.. EVA astronautmay be subjectedto the stressesassociatedwithperformingin a
_: confinedenvirnnment.Little,seeminglyunimportant,EVA suitfeaturesmay
- contribute to a higher productivity whenthe cre_,lan pePformsEVAon a
repetitivebasis. For example,featuressuchas the abilityto withdrawones
: arms from the EVAsuit appendagesto touch the face or other parts of the body
mayenhncpeformancsigtficanly.i"lieua°fetherPresenteSUitnSyStemt"n°sescratch s" o helmetprotruberances
Injury/Illness,in general,is discussedin Section4 of VolumeIf.
.C.
I . °
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Grazing Collision
[:I_ This threat affects all EVA systems that can be damaged by grazing/
co]lislon contacts. This issue is addressed best if computer simulation
- snodelingof all EVA systems in storage, donning,checkout, operation, doffing
and maintenancewere available to identifycritical contact points fur'safety
assessment. The risks associatedwith this threat would _eem to be minimized
if a llardsuit system were planned for space station operationaltime period.
Corrosion
. Strategiesto accommodatethis threat EVA systems are consideredgood
i design practiceas _xpected to be employed in other space station design
effort. Specifically,EVA systems inspectionfor corrosionwould be a part of
the nomal maintenance and inspectionprocedures.
Hechanical Damage
._ EVA systems design should consider damage toleranceto a definable level
as most EVA systems are subject to movement, handling,maintenance and storage
inside and outside the space station, Where mechanisms are required,
....enclosing them to ensure free floating debris/foreignobjects would not
disable tllefunction is required.
i.- Explosion
EVA systems exposure to the explosion threat - pressure systems and
volatile fluid systems - is similar to that _escribed for the space station in
Section 5 of Volume II.
Loss of Pressurization
.. Accepting the EVA suit as a habitablevolume, this threat is discussedin
general for the space station in Section 6, Volume If. The additionalthreat
concern could be resultanteffluent ventingcausing loss of attitude stability
or control while EVA.
Radiation
• The radiationthreat affects EVA systems in two ways: I) requires
-- radiatiunattenuationcapabilityto protect the EVA astronautto allowable
dosage and 2) dependingon how well item l above is done, the EVA astronaut
cumulative dosage may dictate the astronauttime on EVA/time on station and
iaissionscheduling. Additionally,the incidenceof solar flares may require
EVA schedulingconsiderationsuch that the EVA astronaut has time to enter the
:" space station safe llavenor an external safe haven if available to the EVA
"" astronautwithin his immediatework area. The warning time equals the time
from flare optical observation-to-flare/fluencearrival. The radiation issues
are discussedfurther in Section 7, Volumo II.
•._- 86 ,,
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- Out-of-Control IVA/EVA Astronaut
__.- The threat here !nvo]ves both nominal and anominal EVA operations.
Nominally, the EVAastronaut should have adequate handholds and _steatnts
i;" to-and-from and at the work stations, Non-tethered operations should involve
- a minimum of fail-operational/fall_safeattitude control and thruster
.;' subsystems. The on-goSng applicationof the "buddy system"requires detail
- definition for productivitypurposes.
InadvertentDperations
:.%
•• EVA operations, inherently,are high risk operations. Assessmentof a11
i!_*- normal and-contingency-operationsis designed to determinethe impact on EVA
I_" system design. The industry approach for mechanizingcritical functions is to
; require two (or more) levels of fault tolerance in the design approach for
man/machine interfaces.
: Lack of Crew Coordination ,
._ An EVA operationsmanual will have to be devised, eventually,to support
. " normal and contingencyoerat-i_ns.These proceduresshould address all of the
. opefeCio_ phases of the EVA activity. Specific tasks should include
pre-arrangedwork arounds if there is a partial systems failure. For
!TI/ instance,hand signalsare developedfor certain critical activities as abackup to aural interchange.
Abandonmentof Station !
" ImpactsEVA operations in the contingencyarea. II
I
Meteoroid Penetration/Debris
::". These threats are addressed in detail in Sections 8 and 9 respectivelyin
Volume If. A program level decision is requiredto determinewhich size
particlesand what energy levels are to be attenuated, If the risk of these
i, threats are not accepted for EVA crewmen, then the EVA suit system design will
o. be impacted. Designing to attenuate even minimal particle energy threats
appears to dictate the need for a hard EVA sui_ system.
_ ConsumablesOepletion
- EVA or station an*.Icipatedactivity projecticntime and motion studies are
required to determine safe distances the EVA astronautmay operate from the
" space station. The need may exist for an on-orbit/at-statlonrefueling
station. This concept, that of refuelingEVA systems external to the space
-. station, drives the initial design concepts of the advanced EMU to be studied
in FY85. .I
Intrusion/Attack
• Not addressed In this study.
Structural Erosion
| Whether it be from meteomld/debris impacts or floraerosion by atomic
oxygen, the life of the EVA systemswill be impacted, Tii._later phenomenon
" appears to be attitude and mater,al dependent, lhe erosion impact per EVA is
• not an issue if the systems are properly Inspected prior to use. The EVA
, system design definitionwill have to define inspec)iontechniquesthat will
certify the EVA systems for each excursion. The resultantimpact is the cost
-- of logisticsto replaceEVA system elements that have lost their structural
•_. Integrlty.
Orbit Deca_
" This threat is not expected to impact EVA systems unless EVA excursions
• are requiredoutside a reenteringspace station. Then the issues would be
Meteoroid/Debris, StructuralErosion, and TemperatureExtremes.
Loss of Access to a Hatch
• . This threat issue is a design driver for habita_;s to be used by returning
EVA astronauts and, except for suit system/hatch control interfaces, does not
directly impact EVA systems.
Temperature Extremes
Time on EVA, astronautorientationat the work sta1"ionand consumable
[ -;_.. supply are factors in this threat. Nominal mission requirementsplus
reasonablecontingency requirementswill define the EVA system. The resultant
design, when viewed witn survivabilityoutside the deorbitingspace station,
• - will subsequentlydefine the worst case conditionsunder which an EVA
!_ astronaut can function safely.
Oebris
• See "MeteoroidPenetration/Debris",in this section.
Free Orbit
This issue results when an EVA astronaut is thrust away from the space
station. An orbit EVA-to-EVA rescue capabilityshould be considered.
External plug-ins for life support consumablesor ways to "handle'the EVA
- astronaut would be required, Simple design issues - a handhold or sli" .n the
EVA suit (helmet?) so. the disabled EVA astronaut can be "towed" to safL'v,
Other considerations may include the need for a rescue scooter to be available
; , on-orbit.
&
!.. EVA THREATSUi4'4ARY
r " The threats which impact the EVA system and its operationsare a microcosm
_: of the threats of the Space Station itself. The three most serious threats
..m (identicalto those on the station)are: injury/illness,debris and
radiation. There are some scenariosof injury which may impact the station
design, especially the airlock. For example, a hypergolicallycontaminated
:- crewman would need a safe location in which decontaminationis possible
without exposing the entire station environment. The next group of threats
also appear to be strong discriminatorsbiasing the selectiontoward a nard
• suit in the "soft-suit"/"hard-suit"issue. These are: contamination
.: (internal to the EVA
.,
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: suit), mechanical damage, and EVA suit damage from a grazing/collision
-: incident. Cleaning and biological decontamination, as well as the simplicity
_T- and speed of on-orbtt ma!ntenance, will probably be the most significant
• _ discriminatorin EVA System selection.
: In any case, two con¢luslonsappeal dominant. First, the EVA system
chosen must be capable of respondlngto a contingencysituationwithout
prebreathlngor extensive donning time. ._econd.y,mobility becomes a more
dominantconsiderationthan on the Shuttle where tl}eRI4Scould function as a
--T backup. This study found that threats were more effectivelyaddressablewith
tilehard suit at a p-essure of 8 psi or greater.
°
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"" EVA SUIT HISTORY
i 2 In the early days of space fllgllt,astronautswore modified U.S. Navy
, full-pressuresuits as a backup to the spacecraft'spressurizationsystem.
These garments would enable astronautsto breathe if the capsule lost air
pressure,but.t.he_ycould not keep them alive In the severe environmentof
space. So the flrst ast.ro_nautswere confined t_ cramped quarters, awaiting a
suit that would let them step outside.
The developmentof such a space suit was no simple task. In addition to
supplyingoxygen to astronauts leaving an orbiting spaceship, _: must also
protect them from the higil-energyradiationof the sun. ).loreover,the suit
..- must prevent the astronaut from either frying or fre, Ing in temperaturesas
- higllas 250°F on the side exposed to the sun and as low as -65°F on the side
_- in the shadows. And if these were not problemsenough for one piece of
clothing, a space suit must be able to llithstandmicrometeorites,tiny°"
particleswhipping through space. Such a collision has not yet occurred,but
:i if it did und a micrometeoritepunctured an astronaut'ssuit, oxygen would
leak from the suit and the astronautwould need to get inside quickly_
L " A suit designed as part of the Gemini program solved these problems and
_./" allowed astronautsto emerge from the cocoon of their spacecraftto undertake
_. - extravehicularactivity (EVA). Tillsled to the developmentof a suit that
, permitted astronautsto walk on the surface of the moon. By the time of
L Skylab, astronautswere routinelyleaving their orbital workshop to repair
equipment,change film, and carry out a variety of EVAs.
_- The suit designed for space-sh_ittlemissions allows astronauts to do
c these jobs more readily and to perform other tasks that were never before
....,: possible. Technically referredto as the extravehicularmobility unit (EMU),
the suit and life-supportsystem provide astronautswith greater flexibilitym_ • .. .
u,. , in tileirshoulders,arms, and hands. When a Skylab astronauttried to pull
•_ _ film from a telescopemounted outside the spacecraft,the movements were stiff
-...i and awkward, as though he were wearing 20 layers of binding c_thing.
._ . Improvedjoints witilbearings and friction-resistantmaterial allows Shuttle
-. astron,'.utso remove film from a satellitewith greater facility. Shuttle
astronautsare handier in space -- able to use a wrench more easily, for
: instance. The days when a space suit would be used in one mission and then
i • displayed in a museum are gone. Shuttle EMU's are designedto be used again
and again over a 15-year period. Ratl_erthan producing each suit speciallyto
fit each astronaut,NASA now manufacturescomponents in sizes ranging from
extra small to extra large. No longer the beneficiariesof custom tailoring,
;.. shuttle astronautsmust shop off the shelf choosing a pair of pants for
.. example, from a selectionof six different sizes. Wiienthe misslon is over,
; the suit is broken down into its various parts, cleaned, and readied for reuse.
. :. Unlike previous space flights,where space suits were required attire,
shuttle flights call for astronautsto wear theirs only for extravehicular
. activity. Otilerwisethey will wear simple blue overalls. For an EVA,
ilowever,the astronaut first puts ..na liquid cooling and ventilationgarment
_ that will dispose of the excess heal generatedwhile working in a space suit.
" NASA quickly learned the importanceof this article of clothing - several
:.--i Gemini space walks had to be ended early because the astronautsbecame
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: overl_eatedand exhausted. Developedfor use in the Apollo program, the liquid
_: cooling and ventilationgapment is a one-piece,zippered suit that looks like
:'_ mesh long johns and contains about 300 feet ot plastic tubing. By ci_culati,g
c_,_" cool water through this tubing, _l)egarment can dispose of 2,(]00Btu's per
_----._-:. l)our,the amount of heat produced during strenuousexercise. T,e suit also
-- -- ¢on_aln_s!!Q_se_sLllatcollect the Q_3gen used to vent_!Ia_t_e_l)ebody'_ surface
• i and ret__rnit to the portable life-supportsystem on tl)eastronaut's back,
_.- .:- Once the liquid cooling and ventilat_,_n.qaY_entis on, tlleastronaut is
ready to do[_tl_ewillieouter suit tnat is _amiliar from earlier space
.: flights, Improveddesign has significantlyreeuced the time astronauts need
• to spend dressing. It took an hour to put on tileApollo moon suits and
- life-supportsystems; it takes a shuttle astronaut I0 tu _,_minutes to put on
"- an EMU.
_i" "-- First tI_eastronaut dons the lower-torsoassembly,which looks like a
_t....- baggy pair of pants with attached boots. The lower-torsoassembly is
_ .. constructedof nine layers of material: tileinner two, called the pressure-
_" ". - restraintgarment, maintain the atmosphere inside the suit; the outer seven,
_-- called the thermal micrometeoritegarment, protect the astronautboth f_om
' micrometeoritesand the extreme temperaturesof space. An astronaut puts on
•" the lower-terseassembly much the same way one dons a pair of pants on earth -
--' except in space you can put on your pants t_o legs at a time
" -" Second, the astronaut gets into the hard upper torso. This is a rigid,
_-_"!:_... fiberglassshell that resembles a vest and has both sleeves and backpack
._. life-supportsystem attaclledto it. The hard upper torso is mounted to tl)e
air-lockwall of the vehicle. To put it on, the astronautmust squat down and
then slide up, snaking the arms thrG,Jghthe sleeves and putting the head out
....... the neck ring• The astronaut tl_enconnects the upper and lower torsos by
:'" locking the waist ring.
_¢" .:
_.._.,:. Third, the astronautputs on gloves that attach by wrist connectors to
:;= the sleeves. Tiloughnot custom-fitted,as they were for the Apollo suits, the
::-: EMU gloves are more flexible Spacesuitengineer Ronny Newman says that with
_, ." •
the new Et_Ug_,ove,an astronautcould pick up a dime - with practice• An
insulatingmitt like a kitchen hot pad can be placed over ti_eglove when the
,:
astronamltmust handle hot objects•
,.._" Finally, the astronaut puts on a helmet. Made of polycarbonate,a
_._ transpe.rentimpact-resistantplastic, this is one piece of equipment that has
....:. remained rela'_ivelyuncllangedsince the days of Apollo. Tilevisor assembly,
-_: witlladjustableeyeshades to block out sunlight,is still placed over ti_e
_!_ ; helmet to protect it from d_mage. If the sunlight becomes excessivelystrong,
- - the ast,'onaut,:anpull down a special gold-platedvisor that serves as a
.... one-way m;rror,
. ... Once inside the EMU, the astronaut checks out the crucial life-support
system. The backpack is mounted to the s_Ht so that all the oxygen and water
hoses remain inside the hard upper torso. In this way no external hoses can
"_:: .. become tangled or snagged. The system contain._lithium hy,Jroxidc an_._ters
:_-.... that remove carbon dioxide so astronautscan rebreatheexi)aledair. There is
__i -'. also a backup oxygen that, if the primary system fails, can provide oxygen for
30 minutes, sufficienttime for the astronautto return to the Shuttle
-: orbiter.
- ,_i"-
This sequenceis shown in Figure (,-l. (306)
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TO SHOW THE READER THE STEPS
" NECESSARYTO DON THE SUIT
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The portable life-support system, which also houses the astronaut's
_:- rldto communication e_qutpment, has a chest-mounted dtsplay and co1I¢rol
_ module. The astronau_ can monitor-and adjust life-support functions thro_jIl
-" the LED readout atop the module. The ltf_e-sMpport system suppltes enough
' power, waCer, _oxygen to sustain an astronaut far up to seven-hours. After
. checking pressur_._nd oxygen flow, the .ast;ronaut tS re'atly to disengage the EHU
:- from the wall and depart the spacest_Lp.
. Because a fltght plan might call for an EVA of as m__nyas seven hours -
•:_ a long ttme to be res¢rtcted to a space suit - NASAhas provided the EllUs wtth
i: i. someof the conveniences of hon_. If astronauts get thtrsW, they can stp
_i water from a tub tn the lower part of the helmet that t connet d to a
ha|f-liter drink bag mounted-_n the upper torso, If astronauts get hungry,
" they can e_t a compressed ruit bar that ts a so posi ioned insid he
._.. helmet. If a male astronaut must urinate, there is a collection device under
the ltqutd cooltng and ventilation garmet. (Plans call for _vomenastronauts
"* to wear a dtaperltke Disposable Absorption Collection Trunk.)
.-- Malfunctions t n both life-support systems caused the cancellation of the
EVA scheduled for the fifth shuttle mission of November 1982, Both prol_lems -
a faulty magnetic sensor that disabled a blower fan and a small, plastic
locking device left out of a regulator - were later diagnosed and corrected.
In the future, astronauts wtll don their EHUsand, attached to thetr
._- orbt*ctng craft by only a thtn tether, perform Important and exhilarating tasks
.:- tn space.
" : EVA SOFT-SUIT
.: _ _ The current Shuttle spacesutt is a pressure retention structure that,
_: • together with a 1tie support system, provides a 1tie sustaining environment
!i : " _hich protects the astronaut against the hazards of space. Such hazards
' include: a vacuumenvironment, temperature extremes of -180 to +277°F, and
Unlike the spacesutts used in the Apollo or Skylab Programs, where the
: entire spacesuit was custom manufactured for a specific astronaut, the shuttle
.... space_utt ts comprised of separate componentswhich can be assembled to make
spacesutts to ftt almos_ anyone (male and female). Several sizes of each
- component are manufactured and placed on the shelf for futur_ use. When
.. needed, the components are selected from the shelf (depending on the
-- astronauts size) and assembled tnto a complete spacesuit. The SSA and the
, Ltfe Support System (LSS), when combined, become the Extravehicular Hoblllty
Unit, or EHU. The EI4Uwtl1 be used for the Sh,4ttle Program.
The SSA ts designed and has been tested for a six-year operational
:" 1t fe. The dest _l permtts low torque body movements requt red for performafce
of tasks tn space. The Htnt Work-Station ts used to hold tools needed by the
astronauts when _orktng tn space.
Nhen pressurized, the "soft" matertal portion of the sutt becomes very
rtgtd and nearly Impossible to bend except where specifically designed Joints
are provided. Such ts the case when you inflate the inner tube of an
automobile tire. The tube becomes very stiff and is difficult to twist or
bend.
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" W!t_hQutheseJoints,It wouldbe vlrtuallyImposslblefor the a_st_ronaut
. _ do useful work. Thesespectal Jointsare located at the knees, wrists,
J shoulders, elbows, ankles, thtglls, andwaist of the SSA. No_nal body
movementsby the astronaut cause the sutt Joints to bend. Th_s flexibtlt_
permits the astronaut _e conserve his energy, reduce fatigue and to work forD
longper!adsof ¢!m.
: A typical cross-section of the SSAis 11 layers deep consisting of; the
Liquid Cooltng Ventilation Garment (LCVG)(2 layers); pressure retention
garment;(2 layers); and the ThermalHtcrometeorotd Garment(lt4G) (7 layers).
Simply stated, the LDVGmaintains astronaut comfort, tile pressure retention
garmentprovidescontainmentof the breathingair,and the ll4Gprotects
againstthe mlcrometeoroldswhichhlt the suit,and insulatesthe astronaut
fromthe extremetemperaturesof space. See Figure6-2,Table6-2.
_, Table 6-2. EVASUIT (SHUTTLE)
= Followlngare briefdescriptionsand illustrationsof the unitsthatcomprise
_ the Spacesuit Assembly. (369)
1. CommunicationsCarrier Assembly(CCA)
:. ' 2. Hard UpperTorso Assembly(HUT)
:.- 3. ArmAssembly
, _ 4_ Lower Torso Assembly(LTA)
. t 5. Glove Asembly
_-, 6. Helmet Assembly
7. Ex,:ravehtcular Visor Assembly(EVVA)
'- 8. LiquidCoolln9VentilationGarment(LCVG)
9. Urt.ne CollectionDevice (UCD)
10. InsultDrinkBag (IDB)
! '..
1. CommunicationsCarrier Assembly(CCA) - Figure 6-3
The CommunicationsCarrier is a skull cap that interfaces wtth the
• .: Electrical Harness Assembly. It contains a microphoneand earpllones for voice
communications. The skull cap ts madeof teflon and nylon/lycra fabrics.
- 2. Hard Upper Torso Assembly(HUT) - Figure 6-4
The Hard Upper Torso is a vest-like rigid fiberglass shell which
: _. incorporated provisions for Am, LTAand Helmet attachment. A Hater Ltne and
Vent Tube Assemblyis fastened to the shell interior and interfaces wtth the
- LSVGand the Ltfe Support System(LSS).
The main portion of the LSS, containing water and oxygenstorage and
" : circulation provisions, mountson the back of the HUT, while the LSScontrols
: mount on the frontwithin easy reach of the astronaut.
°
• 3. AnnAssembly- Figure 6-5
'i The Arm interfaces with the HUTby a ring that retains the AnnScye
:.- Bearing tn the HUTGtmbalopening. The upper and lower arm Joints are
_ :_. separated by an am bearing which allows lower ann rotation. The lower ann
al so provides for stzl ng adjustments and fop qutck-dfsconnect/di sconnectof
• the glove vta a wrlst disconnect,
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4. Lower Torso Assembly(LTA) - Figure 6-6
The LowerTorso Assemblyof the spacesutt consists of an integrated Body
Seal Closure, Waist, Waist Bearing, Leg, Tillgh, Kneeand Ankle Joints plus
removal Boots. The LTAencloses the lo_er body and interfaces with the HUT
via the body seal closure. The flextble waist section and waist bearing
afford the astronaut a large degree of movementabout the waist e.9., bending
and hip rotation.
5. Glove Assembty-Ftgure 6-7
I
.. The Glove is madeup of a restraint and bladder encased tn a TMG. Tile
gloves protect the astronaut's wrists and handsand are attached to the
spacesutt arms at the wrist disconnects. The 9loves incorporate a rotary
_ bearingto a11owwristrotation,a wrist_ointto provideflexion/extension
. and fabricJointsfor thumbsand fingers,plusa hot pad for protectionof the
handfromextremehot and coldextravehicularconditions.
6. HelmetA_.sembly- Figure6-8
The Helmet Assemblyconsists of a transparent Shell, Neck Ring, Vent
:_ Pad, Purge Valve and an adjustable Valsalva device• The Helmet is secured to
ti)e HUTand provides an unobstructed field of vision. Optical clarity of the
transparent shell is madepossible by the use of rugged, impact resistant
polycarbonate material. A vent assembly, bondedto the inside rear of the
polycarbonate shell, serves to diffuse the incoming gas over the astronauts
• race.
7. ExtravehicularVisorAssembly(EVVA)- Figure6-9
The ExtravehicularVisorAssemblyis a IIght-andheat-attenuatingshel1
_htch fits over the Helmet Assembly. It is designed to provide protection
_ "- against micrometeoroid acttvtW and accidental impact damage,plus protect the
,_k_ crewmanfromsolarradiation.
_!_ A special gold coating gives tile sun visor optical characteristics
"_ slmllarto thoseof a two-waymirror;it reflectssolarheat and11ght,yet
permitstheastronautto see. Adjustableyeshadesmay be pulleddownover
"_-_ the visor to provide further protection against sunlight and glare
I 8. Ll_.Id Coollng Ventllatlon Garment (LCVG)- Figure 6-I0
:i The Liquid Cooltng Ventilation Garmentis a close-fitting undergarment
covering the body torso and lt_s. ;c incorporates a network of fine tubing
" that is maintained in close contact wtth the astronauts skin by the outer
/ layer of stretchable open fabric. The spacesutt is so well Insulated that
= normalbo(_yheat maintains warmth, even on the cold, dark side of the
_' spacecraft.However_coollngIs required,thereforewater is clrculated
:_ through the LCVGtubing to removeexcess body heat. Water flows through the
F: T various inlets and return tubes and must be uninterrupted tn order for the
_, garment to be effective. The LCVGalso uses ventilation ducttng to return
_ ventflowfromthe bodyextremitiesto the EMU LifeSupportSystem(LSS).
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:" 9. Urine Collection Device (UCD) - Figure 6-11
. ..-"
The Urine Collection Oevtce t_sworn over the LCVGand provides for the
'-_.-- hygtentc collection, storage and eventua_l transfer of astronaut urlne
:"_ dtscharged durtng extravehtcular actt vt ties.
_.
,_:: lO. Insult Drink Bag (]DB) - Figure 6-12
._,o
'-. , The %DRis a sealed bag wtth a capacity of 21.0 oz. of potable
:::-.. (drinking) water. The bag ts secured by velcro to the tnstde front of the
;.. HUT. H_ter ts readtly accessible to the astronaut through a mouthpiece
located at the top of the bag.
EVAHARDSUIT (401)
..
/ AmesResearchCenter of NASAhas had several studies 1n-houseand others
. - under contract to design and develop EVAsuits for future needs. Theseare
• : showntn Ftgures 6 13 and 6-14. The AHESAX-1 hard spacesutt tn 1966
•.. demonstratedmulttple beartng technolo_ and later the AX-2 sutt demonstrated
i rotary closure, increased waist flex range, and metal bellows in the joints.
Studies have been done since the 1960's to incorporate high pressure
, technology and to vertfy Jotntc designs suchas that showntn Figure 6-15. A
" secondgeneration of suits were demonstratedby Litton in their series of RX
i " suits which used armored rolllng convolutes at tile extremity Joints. The
Lttton AESsuit incorporated the multlple bearing concept in the shoulder and
_ • hip areas with amoredrolling convolutes at the elbow, waist, knee, and
_, ,. ankle. Toreldal Joint technology was used exclusively for the AtResearctlAES
- _ sutt except for a multtple bearing shoulder joint. A multiple bearing sutt
_- concept was a3so proposedby %LCDover whlch demonstrated tn mock-up
.... configuration an Interesting multiple bearing waist Joint.
'i "-"
- Oneof the suits to be demonstratedtn recent years ts the AmesAX-3
.... (Figure 6_-16)which incorporates lessons learned in the previous suits, The
' torso employshard structure both above and below the dual plane entw closure I
....................... and-tn the briefs section between the waist and hip Joint. The torso closure
ts geometrically simtlar to the closure used tn the RX-4 hard suit. Thts
- conftgurution provides maxtmumarea on the back of the sutt for mounttng ltfe-
: support systems (LSS) componentsand pemtts ease of donntng.
.. Since mobility, minimumleakage, long operational life, and low cost of
fabrication are of primary concern tn thts development, mobility Joints were
.-- designed to meet these requirements wtth mtntmal developmentrisk. All soft
componentelements constst of a multtple lamtnate structure of neoprene-coated
nomexand rtp stop materials. The AX-3 Joints are shownIn Figures 5-17 and
' 6-18. The shoulder Jolnt employs three sealed beartngs and an tnternal
: linkage, tapered rolltng convolute tn the ffrst element of the Joint. The
elbow incorporates a two-segment, dual-opposed, soft rolltng convolut_
arrangement that opt;tmtze<Fjotnt range vs. jotn¢ length. The htp Jolnt ts
:_-- stmtlar to the AX-1 and AtResearchAESconfiguration whtch consists of a
:.: sealed bearing at the htp and thigh locations, a transJ?.ton element, and a
•:. single-axis, soft rolltng convolute. A tree-segmenttoretdal :Joint ts uttltzed
: at the knee, The ankle Joint achieves two-axts motion through the use of an
_.: internal, two-axts glmble arrangement and a dual-opposedsoft rolllng
_:, convolute. The "elliptical" cross-section watst Joint employsa single-axis,
T : ; dual-opposed ro111ng convolute.
1
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" To achieve a broad range of sutt sizing, interchangeable rings of
varyinglengths,attachedby n_ans-_4_ an "Organ-type"wirecoupling,a11ox
for sizingaboveand belowthe elbox-andknee (a similarschemewas designed
:)L for sizing the _rso).
! An anttt_opometrtc measurtag device provides a convenient meansfor
-. selectingthe correct sizing rtng lengths for sutt subjects (shownin Figure ---- -
:: 6-14). A untvers¢l ftt boot, similar to the concept develuped for tim Ames
_) :. AX-2 suit, eliminates the need for custom boot liner--that typically have been
-- used in the past.
7'_, , The goals of the AX-3 developmentwere to demonstrate that a high-
- •' pressure suit, incorporatingstate-of-the-_rt technology, could be developed
?jT ' which would provide excellent mobility, low leakage, low torque, and long
._i tl; cycle ltfe.
_i_,_: The AX-3 suit successfully demonstrated improvedmobility (measured": joint torques an order of magn_tudolower than cu rent shuttle suits), lowered
doffing, modular construction (a range of limb inserts to fit the required.population distribution) and machine fabrtcabtltty to reduce manufacturing
_:i costs. The sultIs alsoamenableto providingbetterprotectionagainst
__ radiation becauseof its predominantly metal structure.
:_.i 6LOVEDESIG.(40l)
=_;-- Themobility of the gloves at pressures up to 8 psta causes one of the
_: greatest design challenges for suit designers. The higher pressure trys to, L,
_ stratgnte_ out the fingers and balloon out the palm resulting in reduced
.... mobility feel and dexterity.
Careful _ttentton to detatl design of joints have restored a great
amountof feel dexterity and mobility. One design uses a rolling convolute on
..... the first metacarpal Joints of the fingers and thumband using mini integrally
•_- formed convolutes on the Joints of the fingers and thumbsis shownin Figure
6-19. Another design uses a textured rubberized fabric with rubber ttps on• .
.: the finger tips with a restraint in the palm and on the wrist to keep the ,
. gloves froln expandingor ballooning too much. This is shownin Figure 6-20.
• Three companiesand NASA/_neshave built four variations of an 8 psta
" glove for testing and evaluation. The advancedglove would need to be able to
-" havegoodthumb-Ist fingeropposition,goodtoolgrip,and the abilityto
' replace the glove xhlle still on orbit (but not on EVA).
The glove area is also one of the hardest areas to protect from various
foms of radiation, because if tt's thick enoughfor radiation protection,
it'stoo thickfop mobllltyand dexterity.For n_ostlow inclinationLEO
missions,thisis nota problem,but forlEO missionsand somehigh
-' inclination orbits, increased protection may be necessary.
L
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_ Integral ly formed
_-" convol utes
Ii Glove Is one piece 5HI.'_- fusion form d fabric
reinforced laminateRoll tog convolute tumb ft rst metacarpal
-i coincides with hand*s dtrecLion of motion
naturaJ fold range .* 45_ range t 30°
i {90° flexion) '_Thumb first metacarpal
. roll Ing convolute
_.,_ Gtove disconnects from
-_. long Itfe wrist Joint for
: sizing/wear replacement ible long life
wrist-Joint range --
- fle_ionlextenston ._ 60",
adductlonlabductton ._ 30* "
Figure 6-19 8psia Glove Concept
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MINI-WOI(KSTATION
The Htnl-WorkS_atl_ (MWS)is used•to-tetheran as_:ronautwearinghis
:: _ Or.her ExtravehlCblar-Hoblllty-Unlt(Spa_esult)at a works-iteand to carry
toolsfromthe Shuttletoolstowageareato the workarea. The I_S Is
•--- attachedby the astronautt_ tirefrontof the spacesultHardUpperTorso,
:. therebymakingthe MWS and ell attachedtoolsreadilyavailablefor the
.:
._-- astronau_ to use when necessary. The MWStether ts a 4-foot long, self-
:_ retractingcordwltha multlpurpos_end effector(coflnector)whichallowsthe
• astronaut to easily attacll the tether to circular sections (handraJls, door
•- drivelinkages,etc.)or to flatplate. Tetheredto a position,and with _
_.i. toolsIn reaoh,the astrenautcan performtasksin the Shuttlepayloadbay and
:: remainrelativelystationary.See Figure6-21.
TOOLCADDY
.- Before leaving earth, the astronaut knowsthe specific tasks to be
•_ performed tn space, Accordingly, the majority of the tools are grouped by the
: task to be perfermed. Thesegroups of tool) are placed in Tool Caddies which
: can be attachedto the Mini-WorkStation. Toolsfor emergencies,suchas jam
:; i removal tools, are also placed in caddies. The Tool Caddyshell is an B-inchby 13 Inch stiffened fabric which folds over the tools, closes and seals wtth
• ! velcro. Each caddy is attached to the MWSvia a ring and pin whtle each tool
;i" is attached to a 3-foot long tether on the caddy. See Figure 6-22.
_'i _U TV CAMERANDLIGHTS
The EI4UTV Cameraand Lights are worn on the Spacesuit Extravehicular
V4sor Assemblyduring EVA. The four lights provide the astronaut with the
t 11umtnation requi red for effective accomplishmentof extravehtcular tasks
__ when in the shade or on a dark side portion of an orbit. The astronaut can
:.- select the numberof bulbs illuminated on either side of the helmet, t.e,
none, one, or two on either side. The upper portion, or housing, of the
•- assembly ts used to mount NASA'sminiature TV camera. Also mountedin the
.;. housing is an on/off switch, a small light (LED) for indication of power on,
and a small sliding knob for focusing the TV camera lens. The circular
:. portion on top of the housing is the antenna which transmits the picture to
the orbiter cabtn, then to earth, thus providing the orbiter cabin crek_nembers
_ and ground personnel with a duplicate of the EVAcrewmember'sview. See
Figure 6-23.
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_l _ The EVA Por_b}e Foot.-R_stralnt ts designed to provtde restraint at the
|I. workstte during, certain FVA tasks where the astronau_ is required to use
It"- torque, whlch re_utr.es, In the weightless atmosphere of spase, that the
|li; astronaut's feet be locked Into place. The restratnC's long rod is a
|T. t_lescoptng boomwhtcil has. a clamp which can be located at-any point along the
m_" boom. The telescoping boom and-c-lamp are normally mounted on the forward and
_," aft payload bay-bulkheads (walls). The I_l_¢fo_assembly, which ts normally
_; stowed in tile tool stowagearea, is attached to the-boom clampby the
:- astronaut when its use is required. The platfom assembly consists of a
atfom-wlth foot resttal_t and tether attachmentpoints. The platformmwrotated to allow the astronaut to be in nearly any position required.
FtguPe 6-24.
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" : Figure 6-24 EVA PortableFoot Restraint
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_: _-. I.IANNEDI4ANEUVERINGUNIT (HHU)
The (;u_rrent-Hi4Uis a device designed i_rimarlly to enable the EVA
'---:= astronaut t_maneuver, without tile restriction of mere hand,over-hand
'--: .;!: translation,, in and around-the vtcinttT-of the Shuttle orbiter up 1;oa range
•" -- of 300 ft. WtSha delta V capabtll_ of about 6(J feet per second, the device
:J" - provides transportation from shuttle to workstte, and attitude stabilization
LC ::' required to work at, or rJgidtze to the workstte. The MHUalso provides a
+::-"" limitedtrunsportcapabilityfor_ools and equipment.Tim alxtlltyto fly away
!_ "i( from or arounda vehicle allews a stable standoff position for photo
Z-:__ :-.-" documentationand generalobservation,or a closeupinspectionof all partsof
;-:. the vehicle. ,
. . .. ,
i_=.. l.tIUsafetyemploysfullyredundantfail-safeactivesubsystemsfor
+_' : attitude control Including automatic attitude hold, electrical power, and
i_; propulsion,and Isolationvalves provldlng immedlate thrusttermlnatlonon
i)_" eitheror bothpropulsionsystems. One singepointfailureinherentin any
!_.-
_ propulsionsystemis lineor tank ruptureand venting,whichon an MHU can
)_:_.. result tn uncontrolled propulsive effects. The requirement for active shuttle
__ rescue reduces risk to an untethered astronaut but restricts both EVAand
,_. shuttle for timeltnes and propellant redlines. BuddysystemMHUrescue and
_- :- propellanttransferimprovesHMU safetybut has limitedrange. Advanced
- missions requi ring greater flight di stances and remote operations wt11 al so!-_:: requireg eaterreliabilityforcontrolof f iluresandmay involvegreater
,_:. : failureseparationand controlled(zerothrust)fallure-venting.When
_--__. on-orbitfacilitiesincludepropellantstorageand OMV transportation,HMU
_-: rescuewill be viablefor nearlyany missionor activity.
.. •
_ _ "_ : _ l ""' I_U performancefor futuremissienswlI1 requlre addltionalcapabilIty
i_L . necessaryto supporton-orbitassemblyand servicingactivitiesassociated
)_: with spacestationconstructionand operation.Simpletransportationof
-
personnelwlllexpandto transportationof largermore involvedmaterialsas a
+_ supportto morecomplexEVA activities.Associatedwiththisare requirements
):.. - for greaterpropellantand deltaV potential.As transportationof larger
massobjectsbecomesa necessity,so willthe abilityto compensatefor
_- - shiftingcenterof gravitieson MMU dynamics.Complicatingthis situation
- - : will remainthe needfor a non-contaminatlngpropulsionsystemfor the
• protectionof sensitive equipment, scientificexperimentsan EVAcrewmember
i: himself,arisingfromthe closeproximityworkan MMU willbe requiredto
i:- . perform.
___..
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EVAASSESSHENT
Aggregate issues involving _EVAmust address not only the suit system butalso the environment in which the suit system must function. These areas of
, concern include:
-6
; Task-Assessment
Task-Suit System Interface
Suit SystemLogistics
._ / ......................... Man-Suit System I,,terface
_ Figure 6-25 showsthe relationships of the EVAtask elements. Impl-ied
are the function, threat, appltca_on and importance of logistics element in
_:- selecting what the EVAsuited crewmanis to do, where he is to do it and under
• what conditions. All of these elements contribute to EVAsuit system design
defi ni tt on.
Task Assessment
The EVA/suit system exists to extend man's capabilities to function in
. ---inhospitable environments. Tids could include exploration, surveillance,
" fabrication, servicing, repair, installation, transportation and rescue. Each_ of these tasks generates requirements on the manas well as the suit system.
._ Each task must be assessed for threat impact, interfacedefinition,logistics
):-:.. and procedures/requirements development. For instance, in looking at the
_ considerable functions for the EVAsuited crewmanone sees issues that must be
_i : addressed. Table 6-3 relates functions to threats. Each of these threats
must be assessedto determine 1) if adequate strategies are available toprotect the crewman/equipment,2) if contingencies can cause inordinate risk
:.,:_:- " exposurewithin the selected strategies and/or 3) if the candidate functions
L-i should be deleted from the EVAagenda.
_ : .. Task-Suit SystemInterfaces
i Similarly, as above, the interface issues must address each planned EVA
I
function and tts ccompanyingtools and equipment. The ba ic issue I,.the EVA
i suitedcrewmanexitinga habitat. To accommodatethe limitedcapabilStlesof- the existing shuttle EVAsuit, the habitat (orbiter) has to lower its internalatmospheric pressure to reduce the suit-cabin delta pressure minimizing the
_ " crewman's time for prebreathtng. A clear definition of this requirement was
' " not included in the orbiter developmentspecifications in 1972.
" Becauseof this oversight, the orbiter/current EVAsuit does not allow
: for immediate egress of the EVAsuited crewmanwithout the risk of exposure to
bends. That is, the lower limit of the orbiter cabin pressure is dictated by
air mass/volumeflow requirement to cool avionic equipmentand the fire hazard
exposure whenthe oxygenpartial pressure is increased at the lower cabin
_. - pressures. At the present, 10.2 psta is the minimumcabin pressure allowed in
" the orbit crew compartment. There are approachesbeing assessedto allow the
- space station to function with an 8 psi cabin so that existing soft-suit
! : (4 pst) technology is directly applicable for the next decadeof space explor-
.=. atton. This seemscounterproductive. It would appear, on the otk,cr hand,
-. _ that developing a suit whose tnterndl pressure approaches14.7 psi should be
_ -- the goal to alleviate these suit/cabin delta pressure generated issues.
• ,:, "
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-__ Additionalinterfaceissuesare,functiongeneratedas notedin Table
: 6-3. Itcan be seenthathighrisktasks,thatis tasksthateypose_the EVA
" suitedcrew_n tocatastrnpillcenvironments, m_Ybecu_ G_nd_Idatesfor| " automationQr d_e!et_ionas credibleiun-tlons.Theseissuesare addressedby
costof roboticsvs. riskto EVA sult_dcrpmen. Evenif externaltasksare
" assignedto robotics,the residualrequlrem_n_remalnsto serviceand maintain
the roboticsystems.
-. A key task-suitsystemInterL,,cPissuei_. thatof protectionof the
suitedcrewmanfromthe environmentsexpectedin LEO and eventuallyGEO
• orbits. With radiationbeingthe driver,considerationof a suittechnology
..':- thatallowsampleattenuationof radiationto the crewmanat higherand polar
:/. orbits seemsmandatory.
SuitS_stemLogistics
°
_. Thisissuemay be the eventualdriverto go to hardsuit (non-cloth)
.... elements,The presentshuttleEVA suitrequirementsformaintenance,repair
and refurbishment - unless :he suit inventmy is dramaticallyincreased - i
•.= wouldmake its use in the plannedspacestationimpractical,If possible.tlalntenance,repairand refurblshmentof tllesuitsystemin additiontoF
on-orbitsuitsizingand decontamin=tlonappearto be key designdriversfor
; an EVA suitsystemthatmust functionin an LEO,GEOand eventuallya cislunar
_ environment.Theselogisticrequlrement_"appearto grosslydefinea suit
whoseelementsare readilyassembled/disassrmbled,haveresistanceto/ :
abrasion/erosion,are completelyintewchangeableand are easilydecontamihated
as a wholeor as separateelements.
...." Man-SuitS_stem Interface
'L_ " In SUit design, the physical and anthropomretric needsare addressed.
_- In practice, the latter may suffer from logistics (sized spares) problems, not
necessarilyfromlackof designattention.Basicissuesat the man-sul+.
°
interfaceare thoseissuesthatbecomefatiguegenerators.The softsuit
technologyappearsto be pressurelimitedas increasesin pressureat or above
the 5 psi levelappearto immobilizethe suitedcrewman° Thisis eitherin
motion of arms and legs or gloved digits.
; The NASA-ARCAX-2 and AX-3 suit developmentsaddress the arm and leg
. mobility such that reach and dynamicmotion appears to be independent of
:'" pressure.
, ..
End effectors, whether they are gloves or robotic extensions of the
- suited crewmanneed further design assessment. Experimental hard/soft gloves
•_ and gloves studies continue. Endeffectors that are essentially manipulator
systems operatingreplaceablespecializedtoolsby an unglovedhandwithinthe
suit pressure shell could be considered after the function assessment
ii " determines which discrete tasks the EVAcrewmanis obligated to perform.
._ Someminor problems have occurred in the existing shuttle EVAsuit with
c mounting of the communication systemelements. There may be an advantage to
- helmet mountingcommunicationgear vs. crewmandonnedsoft cap mounting.
• .?.'
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-_ _VA ISSUES
_ Too1 Problems
-:' EVA tasks in the past have beefl tlampered by the difference in wl=at was
.... experiencedin tralnlng and what was reallzed in actual on-orblt operations.
On STS-I], the crew commented that the equ!pm__nt hey trained on was not the
_. same configurationas the actual _rtlcle. Additionally,the Solar Hax flight,
-:: STS-13, presented t_e problem where the EVA tool-to-SolarHax interfacing i
•_ tasks were hampered by interference. It has been determinedthat the
_- interfaceon the Solar Max was not as reflectedon the drawing used in EVA
_" tool design and task plannln9.
, EVASuitCabtl ty
The present EVA suit requires a reduced cabin pressure and prebreathing;
_ 10.2 psia and 40 minutes. "[he EVA suit used on the Space Station should
•.:. support immediateegress from the normal cabin pressure (i.e.,8 psla or
" greater), Donning and doffing capabilityof the suit should be investigated.
" Exposure to Radiation
A long term issue, not directly addressed, is the impact of EVA crew
" member exposure to backgroundradiationexclusive of solar flares. The
:_. relationshipof time on EVA must be related to the total ram dose per flight,
per quarter,pe_ year and per lifetime, This assumes solar flare escape to a
, "storm cellar" within 20-mlnutesis possible. The "storm cellar" may be
stationmounted or free-orbitlocated adjacent to areas of EVA tasks a
_-.: distance away from the space station.
_ Some of the EVA's have been fatigue generators,perhaps this is from
_i unexpected contingencies, and ,ack of upper torso muscle-tone maintenance
deficiencies. Also, soft suit tendencies toward immobilization at higher
pressures can generate fatigue. Present exercise techniques operate on the
•- cardiovascular system and the lower torso muscular system; a whole body, or at
," least nptlmlzatlonof upper torso/armsexercise should be considered.
.i
EVA Support
:: Current EVA's involve two crewmen outside and one or more inside. Space
_• Station EVA support may ltmtt the number and length of EVA segments because of
-. the non-EVA time required for internalactivity as well a. space station
maintenance.
... EVA Lighting
There ts a shade-side ltghttng problem wttltout an atmosphere to scatter
•: ltght. Thts requires spectal attention, as tt is difficult to de_ermtne h_w
• much flll-ln lighting Is needed during tests on the ground. The high contrast
_ light/shadeenvironmentin space is not easy to demonstrateon the ground.
..'" i
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-_ Restrat nt
i i:' Limiting resl;ratnts to the foot _ack may be overlooking the nomal fetal
" position of mlcre-gravlty.
T,:,
__ ContingencyOperat!ons
" '. EVAoperational planning should postulate more contingencies ¢o ensure
_ ".'r" tool, c_an and expendablecapability extsts to support off-design
;_ operatlrms.
• EVARescue
" Figures 6-26 and 6-27 showan EVArescue simulation whereas one cretan
• - is returning an incapacitated crewnan to the space station. There maybe an
.-, advantage to constdeHng an external "handle" on the EVAsuit - perhapson the
. .
r" "_ -- helmet to allow one-handtow of an Incapacitated crev_ember.
..
• EVASutt '.4atntenance
Present sutt and backpack (life support system) maintenance and
_ ::_ turnaround doesnot seemcompatible with planned space station operations and
. : stafftng.
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•" Figure6-26 ZoomIn of RescueSimulation
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Figure6,27 View Point Analysisof Rescue Simulation
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I" :i 7. SAFEHAVEN
-" The concept of a "Safe Haven-"in the mannedspace program predates-the
•._: earliest data sears.bedout in supoort of this contract study: circa-1968. A
..... safe haven t s a pl ace wher_ a crew can reti re wlien faced with a threat not
• . immediately controllabl_ in the local Volume. More.than a place, a safe haven
•_- is a capability; the capability to k,,ep l:he crew alive for a specified period
•._. of time whenthe space station has sustained damage. The 1eighth of time the
. sat_ehaw_ncapability must sustain the crew is contingent on the time required
to either Implement repairs and retu._n to routtne operations as possible, or
to rescue the crew. For the low Earth orbit space station concept
_". investigated as part of this study, there are in essence four space stations:
1) the build-up station, 2) the 28-day station, 3) the gO-daystation and 4)
the 15-year station. The build-up station is defined as the tntttal station
.- through the planned 8-man full operations station. The twenty-eight day
- station is the station defined as having to sustain life unit1 tile crew can be
. rescued. The ninety-day station is _e station that must maintain a crew
without physical contact with the Earth for _:hat period of time. The
fifteen-year station is the projected ltfe and safe dtsposal station, that is,
k ..- -- removal from orbit station. A safe haven capability must exist in each of
,.. these space stations as defined. The twenty-eight day station is the one that
................. specifically defines the requirements of the safe havencapability.
" " OPERATIONALNEEDFORA SAFEHAVEN
_.." The safel)avencapabilitymay betterbe definedby lookingat its need.
D,- .
.... Circumstancesthatprecipitatethe needfor a spacestationsafehaven
capabilityand its use are sllownin Figure7-I. When f_cedwitha threat,tile
crewwill haveto make thislogicalassessmentconcerningitscourseof
action. Thislogicflowis no dlfferent hanthoseusedin everydaylifeand
_,. particularlyfor operationsthatmay containinherentdangers.
. It is interesting to note that the secondlevel threat addressed is
solar flare. This subset of the radiation threat is often overlooked, lhe
.. radiationintensityof a solarflare,if directedintothe spacestation
; orbttal sector, can increase the ambient backgrou'adradiation by three ordersf magnitude or more Thi sp cific threat dictates specific need for short
" - termcrewprotectionfromintenseradiation.Thisprotectioniscalledthe
I "storm cellar" for definition's sake. The question to be asked, "Should the
Ii.: storm cellar be Integrated into the total space statton capabtltty?", begtnsto drive the configuration.
t i Continuing with Figure 7-1, once evacuation is deemednecessary, the
o crew must continue with the bookeeptn9tasks typical of any emergency
: .. alternative,In lookingat what the crewmustdo, Figure7-I alsoInd!cates
,1 what the space station capabtlt_ must be to support its emergency
operations. Each task, and tiffs ltsttn9 maynot be complete, tmpltes the need
to be able to accomplish ti)e action specified and also have the necessary
•" hardware to do so.
• . ,,,_,T' N(;T lqI_Ir,_
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-: SAFEHAVENREQUIREIENTS
Thereare variousways to definethe safehavenrequlremenl:s.One
D.- Is to definethe needand anetheris to definetheapproach equipment required
• to satisfy the need. In that the latter approaeh ts contingent on having a
i_ configured-spacestation,the approachusedherew111be to definethe needs
so thattheymay be appliedto manyconfigurationapproaches.Essen¢iallyo
the SpaceS1:atlons fehavenc abilitymustincludethe f llowing:
_ " I. Must removecrew fromcurrentthreatand/orthreatarisingfromthe
_-. - currentthreat.
_ 2. Must includefacilitiesto provideandmaintainminimumhumancomfortsuntilres ueis effec edor untilth crewcan returnto
L,
normal/non-threatenedoperatlons.
3. Mustincludefacilitiesto preventa deterioratingmedical
situationduringperiodof use.
4. Mustnot requirethe use of EVA to transportpersonnelto and from
safehaven/rescuevehicle.
5. Shouldnot considerany designconceptthatrequiresdetachment
fromthe basicstation(FreeOrbit).
.... 6, Mustnot requireany significantreactiontimeto activateand
= occupy the safe haven.
f.
7. tlustprovidecontinuouscommunicationscapabilitywith the ground,
..... the basicstationand potentialrescuevehicles.
_ "- THREAT/SAFEHAVENRELATIONSHIPS
!i" Of the twenty-threethreatsdefinedduringthisstudy,sixteenare felt
. to be driversfor safehavencapabilitydefinition.Figure7-2 relatesthe
-" . safehavendesignrequirementsI;othe threatsexpectedto be encountered.As
can be seen. the ssfe haven design requirements are a microcosmof space
_ station design requirements. Becauseof this. it wo,ld be prudent to look at
_-- the stationas a wholewhen assessingthe safehavencapability.Exceptfor
consumables,the safe havencapabilitycould be integratedintothe overall
f space station capability.
SAFEHAVENOPTIONS
!_. Inthe sameway thatthe tl_reatsdrivedesigncapabilities,the same
design capabilities are related to safe havenoptions. Figure 7-3 addresses4
-- eight options. The Orbiter is _ddmssed as the ninth option primarily to
',, support safe havencapability for the butld-up phaseof the space station.
Once an on-orbit safe havencapability is established, it will be able to
support the 28-day station, the 90-day station and the 1B-year st_tton. Or atleast its design planning should include the _pectfic requirements for each of
these station types. Included tn Figure 7-3 are relative cost estimates to
_.. achieveeachof the safehavencapabilityoptions.
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Figure 7-2 Safe Haven Threat Related Design Requirements
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; Figure 7-3 Safe Haven Options as Impactedby Design Requirements
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I_-, In revlewtn9 the relative Cost options shownin Figure 7-3 it becomes
:. apparent that _adtation protection against the solar flare is going to be a
diffteutt (lestgn issue to resolve. Delettng _hat requirement, there remain• thre -options of eq al relative cost,.accepting he fact that a storm cellar
i is mand_to_'. Of these three, the externally mountedinflatable is not a
1 normally usable_volume. T_ere in_ be ot,he_ logi-_l:tcat.-p_oblemswith the
! extexna117-inflatable safe haven. H_ever, the remaining two are credtble
_ approachesto the prol_lem. Themulti-use area safe flaven tmpltes one volume
'/ usable for the purpose of a safe havenbut used for other purposesas well,
not befng a dedicated safe haven. The other haTf of the station tmplies a
safe havencapability i n two separate volumes.
:_,J. A reviewof reliabilityredundancyrequirements,Vol. IV-AppendlxE,
. indicates that redundancyissues tend to support the "other half of station"
i safe havencapabilityconcept.
The unresolved issue, howeveris howthe "store cellar" is going to be
)-i:/ tntegrat_ into the space state,on design. Figure 7-4 proposesa posstbleapproachbased on the "other half station" safe havencapability. It should
L _i be noted that the store cellar i s a single fai lure potnt. What makest t a
_ store cellar is 1) necessary shielding from the most severe radiation threat,
_I 2) minimumI_igiene facilities and minimumltfe sustenancecapability for up to
_ five days. could be possible to designate the stonn cellar volumeas theI volumewhich is s rroundedby the potable nd gray water tanks, r tank t at
_! could have the water pumpedto surround the store cellar area. Another
_ approach ts to encase the crew in lead ponchos...or any combination of these
_:. approaches. If the store cellar environment can be c_ated dynamically, it
_¢_ could bean integral part of each or both safe havenhalf station capabilities.
_mm.,
)_'" I
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:-- HALFOF_TAT[ON HALFOFSTATION
SAFEHAVE_I SAFEHAVEfl
• CAPABILITY CAPABILITY
g -
• " DOCKIN@ DOCKING
AIRLOCK AIRLOCK
i STORHCELLAR
" I
" Figure 7-4 Safe-Haven/Storm Cellar Relationships
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I8. AREASFORFURTHEREHPHASIS)" Table 8-1 summarizesthe areas tn thts study Identified as needtngfurther emphasis. Similarly, Table 8-2 notes those areas to be looked into asi i- a result of the safety impact on humanfactors assessment.
,! Someof the 1terns maybe underwayor have been completed. The ltsttng
no,co.e,nco.,n.or--o,,..,,.r" ltst Indicates tllat wlthtn the data revtewed there seemedto be areas of data: deficiency.TABLE8-1 AREASFORFURTHE_STUDY
r - AREAOFRECOmmENDEDFUTUREHPHASIS THREAT
.,,-
1. Airlock for lab modul_vs dual egress study ConteminaLion
.... Loss of Access to Hatch
:_:, 2. Atrlock for lab modulevs. delta P pressure Contamination
curtaln study
_-: 3. External stowageof EVAsutt (cost Impacts) Contamination
r" .;i vs. tnternal contamination
_ 4. Free flyer for "dirty" payloads vs. on- Contamination
;. board decontamination/clean roomcosts
:: 5. Up-front costs vs. programcosts for Contamination
)_ _ regenerative ECLSSor a consumable-using Stores Depletion
:': ECLSS
,
,.. 6. User safety requtments documentsvs. Program
user safety ombudsman
': 7. Refurb moduleon orbtt vs. return and refurb Program
.. 8. User guide to automate vs. manual approach Program
- to experiments/processes
J
- g. Testtng one-of-a-kind payload vs, Program
•" recommendingencapsulatlon
I0. On-boardmaterlalllnventor_ control vs. Corrosion
: on-groundcontrel wlth data 1_nk (expanded Contamlnatlon
• HATCO-RI-System) Inadvertent Ops
- Stores Oepletton
..... .- 11. Costs of measuringInternal contamination Program
-" vs, rtsk of accepting contamination
12. Dedicated (module) vs. centrallzed ECLSS Contamination
_ Loss of Pressurization
L: 13. Relaxed contaminant a11owablesper zone Contamination
(hazard critical/contamination sensitive) Injury/Illness
":- vs. minimumcontamlnatlon a11owablesfor _
:_ enttre station
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!-:-: TABLE8-I (CONT'D) AREASFOR FURTHERSTUDY
]_ _-:_. AREAOFRECOt4MENDEDFUTURE RPHASIS THREAT
; _ 14. Threshold Level Values (TLV's) for 24-hour Injury/Illness
stationvs. TLV'sfor 8-hourworkweek
• regimes
i " u .,.
_" 15. EVAdedicated module (w/decontamination Contamination
_'.... capabllity)vs. decontaminationin dedicated
"" airlock
,:
..
- 16. Level of material assessmentand control Program
"_ " for station vs. user} . ,
) :-
:. .
_ . 17. Costof medicalcareon-orbltvs.medical Injury/Illness
screenlng(appendectomies,radiation
max-out,etc.)
-- 18. Realtimecontamlnatlon molltorlng vs. Contamlnatlon
_i-.:. "snapshot"molltorlng
_ : 19. Classified Materials Controls vs. Lack of Cre_ Coordination
L_.. "IndustriallySensitive"materialcontrol
.-.: 20. Highaltitude(Debrls/Radlation)vs. Debris,Radiation,
. ;• loweraltitude(oxygenbombardment) StructuralErosionj
: _ Contaminailon
• 21.Re-orienting station massvs. providing Radiation
shieldingfromsolarflares; .::
: . 22. Optimumrepairlevel: Unitvs. Component Program
i_.....
i 23. Walk-around bottles vs. plug-tn 02 system Loss of Pressurization
. Contamlnatlon
)
•- 24. Synergisticallydevelopbarriersystem Radiation,Debris,
(modulepressure wall ) to accommodate t,leteorotd Reduction,
: debris, meteoroids, radiation, oxygen Loss of Pressure,
bombard[,_nt,pressureredundancy,shrapnel MechanicalDamage,
- shieldlng and structuralInspection/repalr Grazirig/ColIislon,
... • Leakage[-
)
,:. 25.Develop bodyvitalsignsmonitoringsystem Injury/Illness
: for eachcrewmemberwithdataaggregated
• - for controlpaneldisplayor downllstlng
: 26.Definemedicalfacilitiesfor bulld-up, Injury/lllnesb
initialand growtllstations
. D :
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: ,. . :
":' ......- 131
• •t" .-.
........ 00000002-TSC09
- .1)
I'
TABLEB-I (CONT'D) AREASFOR FURTHERSTUDY
+ ....i AREAOFRECOMMENDEDFUTURE MPHASIS TIIREAT i
k :I "
.,,. 27. Provideorbitchangingmaneuveringcapability Debris
of stationto avolddebris,including
determlnlng cycle-rateand totalpropulslon
.. reqUlrements
_ - 28. Develop on-going internationalprotocols Debris
_ for traffic control in space. Expand
.,: NORADScapablIity to Identify debrls down
:,"- to Xmm diameter
h
__ 29. Definefragmentationdispersion of pressure Explosion-- v ssels in a vacuum: calculated disp r on
;,_4 or actual dtsperson (291)
' 30. Definition of blastwave characteristics for Explosion
, typical gas storage vessels (291)
:_. , 31. Betterdefinitionsof fragmentimpact Explosion
:_ , effects on a variety of strutures and
:"T facllitlestypicalof those occurringin
_ ' aerospacevehicle explosions (291)-, :.
_ ..._"
-_ • 32. Centralllzed/Decentrallzedwork stations Lackof CrewCoordination
:" (start on subsystemmatntenance, EVA/EMU
: matntenance and storage, module repai r/
,} refurb,userequipmentmaintenanceand
+-- repair)
: 33. EVA suit vs. chamber/airlockfor hyperbaric Injury/Illness
+.- treatmentof the bends
34. EVAsuit external surface material Contamination
..
._ compatlblIIty or selectedovergarments
35. Small tool "pass through" compartmentto Stores Depletion
' supportEVA vs. costof moduleor airlock
.- press/depress
36. Remoteactuating of airlock outer hatch vs. 4 Injury/Illness
: :: manualactuation by EVAcre_nan I
,. -- 37. Assessmentof personal and equipment l Lack of Crew Coordination
.... restraintsand tether I
I
: 38. Minimize types and sizes of fastening devtcesl Stores Depletion
.;- (weightvs. logisticsimpact) I
'_ I
•- 39. Free flylng(permanentlyco-orbltlngstatlon)l Injury/Illness
:. :_- EVAtool box vs. space station mountedtool l
:.
:-+:_ box l
_: I "
°.4 (
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TABLE8-I (CONT'D) AREASFOR FURTHERSTUDY
. AREAOF RECOMHENDEDFUTURE MPHASIS THREAT|
::.- 40. Clear definition of EVAionizing radiation Injury/Illness
•.-_..- impactto crewmemberand shleldlng I
•,--" capabilityof EVAsuitmaterials 1
' 41. Experiments to investigate and determine I Ftre
.j
propertiesof combustionand propogationof 1
_- firein Microg.
_ I
- ,o
_ :f- !!
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TABLE8-2 AREASFOR FURTHERSTUDY
D'" AREAOF RECOMMENDEDFUTUREEMPHASIS HUMANFACTORSISSUE
.i. ..... ]__.Determinedegreeof automationneededand/or CrisisManagement
desiredfor i,teractivecrisismanagement
2. Expandand disseminateanthropometricdata CrisisManagement
on the micro-gravity"neutralbody"position
..................3. Furtllerdevelopthe softwarearchitecture Crisist4anagement
and approachesto allow edit1n9, recombin-
• ationand understandableannunciationof
many dataelementsto supportrealtime
decisionmakingunderconditionsof stres_
. 4. Developtesting/screenig techniques'_llat CrisisManagement
:...." can identifyor relatesubject'sabilityto
functionundernighstressconditions
-:i" 5. As a partof spacestationsystems CrisisMana@ement
" engineeringand integration,developa
';"• "crisismanagement"overlayof alI space
"_.i stationsignalsend datainterci,angen t-
worksto helpcoordinateaggregationof
:._ annuntations/controlling signals necessary
for crisismanagement(emergencyor
i-. contingencyoperations)
r..C 6. Polarizedshadesvs. opaqueshades Confinernent/Isolation
.L 7. Allowpersonalizationof cabinsor work
• areas(photos,cartoons,books,etc.)
_ includingdecoroptions
8. Definecrewmemberpsychologicaland Confinement/Isolation
physiologicalscreeningelementsto support
-;' functlo_in9in a longtermconfined/isolated
enviroment
9. Includearchltectural/interiordesign Confinement/Isolation
consultationin habitablemoduledesign
!O. Considerpossibilityof single,large-volume Confinement/Isolation
space (l,flatableor structurallybuilt-up
to provide"open"environmentfor crewon
- growthstation
•.• II. Developstandarddecision-m,_kin9techniques Acoustics
_.i to be usedfor insulationvs. isolationof
noise
.L .
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TABLE 8-2 (CONT'D) AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
T'.'. -
•--. - AREA OF RECOMHENDEDFUTURE EMPHASIS HUI4AI¢FACTORS ISSUE
L-. 12. Specify the need for a maximum allowable Acuustics
-,. NC-acousticrequirement_permodule(work
_-- area vs, habitable area) anQ"require acoustic
... subsystemInputapportionmentwithineach
_-" module, Include a qualificationtest to
:. apportionedacousticalrequirements
I_ _,"
13. Providefor standardhandsignalsfor Acoustics_ emergency communicationin untenable noiseenvironment
_ ......... 14, Deflne/providepersonalstoragespace TerritorialIssues
15. Orientcrewtoward"non-violation"of TerrltorialIssues
I personal terrltory
_,:' 16. Include personal consumables(totlet Territorial Issuesarticles,etc,)in a masterlogistics
_,• planningllst
i*" .,
17. Determinemethodof measuringreasonable TerritorialIssues
:'" personal"spacebubble"- flatvs. tlte
_, spherewithinwhiciian individualfeels
! _;.._ threatened.Then,screenforcrewwl_ocan
: -- functionwithinthisvolume
•_I 18. Screencrewmembersfor prej'_Icesand BehavorlalProtocols
• openessto differingculturQ_norms
Ig. Provideeducatlon/orientationfor BehavorialProtocols
crewmembersregardlngcross-culturalIssues
. and problems
:. 20. Train crewmembersto utilized group dynamics Behavori_l Protocols
to work out potential benavorial protocol
confl t cts
:. 21. As a lastresort,developchemical physical BehavorialProtocols
; restraintsystemfor out-of-control
- crewmembers
.. 22. Dedicated module tasks for crew vs. common Scheduling
:. task,al 1-module assignment
:_ - 23. Generalistvs. s_eclalistfor crewtraining Scheduling
: guide1 ines
:
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TAI_LE8-2 (CUNT'D) AREAS FOR FURTHER S¢_h"Y
• ................................ [ ...........
I ".- AREA OF REEOHMENOEI)FUTURE EJ4pHAS_IS HUMAN FACTURS ISSUE
'°
.:. 24, Less than gO day recyclesvs. on-_tatlon Scheduling
• expendablecosts and crew persona]equlp..m._ent_
needed to support extended stay
25. Conslder adequate capablIity for storage C1eaning/Dlslnfectlng
inventoryirlg,handllng and dlsposltionof
_ _ ._ervlclng,maintenance,plain garbage, and
• consumables for cleaning and repair
.: 26. Identlfy f.lmly of cleaning/dislnfecting CIeaning/Oisinfectlng
cnemlcalscompatiblewith selected ECLSS
approach
27. Train crewlnembersin a11 phases of station Cleaning/Disinfecting
tasks, housekeeping
28. Define minimum crew cleanllnessrequirements Cleaning/Disinfecting
- (this may-Tb_n Intra-culturalissue)
29. Deflne requirelnents(total volume and flow C1eaning/Dislnfectlng
• rates) for potaple and non-potablewater
30. Ceasultlng wlth astronauts,develop a Hygiene
i_:- -- standardfor clothing options and nyglene
' ' - consumables options
,4 " 31. Constder schedul i ng Ilyg lena (common) Hygi ene
equipment
i
, 32. Define a private electronic center for each Recreation
i. cabin to tnclude at least a,n entertainment
I center (vlsual/aural),a private televisionli k to Earth, b ckgroundmood generat r
- (white noise)
33. When teaming, screen crewmew,bers for Recreatlon
,.. compatiblerecreation Interests
34. Prepare specificationfor recreation Recreation
equipment/kitpertainingto safety - with
opttons for person
3F. Develop reallstica11owable radiationclose Vlolatlon of Safety
rate tables for part of body for EVA,
flight, quarter,year and whole life
36. Develop c,_lor coding system for all tubing, Violation of Safety
piping, emergency passageway, damage control
equipment and task,_ including "warnings",
"cautions", and "not(:s"
_- ...
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"- TABLE8-2 (CONT'D) AREASFORFURTHERSTUDY
-_
•- AREAOF RECOHMENDEDFUTUREEHPHASIS HUHANFACTORSISSUE
.:°
• 37. Clearly tdentify safety critical segments Violation of Safety
•- : of tasks to tnsure mandatory compliance
l:" :' t 1 (llardware, procedural software)
38, Prepare task flow charts that identify as Violation of Safety
: .;_, many contingency operations as possible to
detemtne ra._ponse need
•: ,':.,
• 39. Screen all carry-on personal equipment
.o
o,
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"; _ Ab_t_Ict
- _ The scope of this study consideredthe first 15 years of accumulatedspace station
'" conceptsfor InitialOperationalCapability(IOC)during the early 1990's.
; Twenty-fivethreatsto the space stationare identifiedand selectedthreats
addressedas impactingsafetycriteria,escape and rescue,and human factors
• safetyconcerns. Of the 25 threatsidentified,eight are discussedincluding
_:_ strategyoptionsfor threat control:fire, biologicalor toxic contamination,
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